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The empirical evidence suggests that firms overpay for fraud liability
and overspend on internal compliance mechanisms (which are not very
effective at preventing fraud). Yet, insiders who commit fraud are rarely
sanctioned for their wrongdoing, which produces moral hazard and
individual underdeterrence.
Two factors explain the failure to sanction managers who commit fraud.
First, managers control the information revealing who was involved in
accounting fraud and, thus, can impede external investigations and
sanctions. Second, managers also influence whether the firm will
investigate and sanction accountingfraud internally. Managers' control
over settlement and the availability of directors' and officers' insurance
further reduce the likelihood that dishonest managers will be sanctioned.
Most proposals have focused on reducing the costs of fraud liability to
firms by raising pleading standards or eliminating corporate liabilityfor
accountingfraud altogether, but have neglected the question of individual
deterrence. Although these proposals might reduce the costs to firms,
accountingfraud cannot be deterred effectively without shifting liability to
those responsible. High levels of fraud are inevitable, so long as social
costs of fraud exceed private costs.
To sanction dishonest insiders, private and public enforcers need to know
their identities and their actions, which is often prohibitively costly to obtain
without firm cooperation. This Article proposes using leverage against the
firm to encourage disclosing private information, thereby lowering overall
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enforcement costs and increasingthe probability that dishonest insiders will
be sanctioned.At the same time, the proposal also reduces the risk that firms
will overpay, because ex post cooperationwill reducefirms' liability.
The Article develops the conditions for superiority of leveraged
sanctions and proposes that their use be expanded to civil and regulatory
actions, eliminating many of the concerns that leverage raises in criminal
investigations. Improved deterrence is significant because it will reduce
accountingfraud, producing more efficient capital markets.
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INTRODUCTION

Securities fraud and its most common variant, earnings
manipulation,' have been the subject of academic study for decades,
yet there is little agreement on the best mechanisms to prevent and
sanction fraud. Although markets, social norms, and ex ante
regulation affect how firms behave, their effectiveness in preventing
fraud is limited.' As a result, recent scholarship and policy-making has
focused on liability to reduce the incidence of accounting fraud.'
Many have argued that current enforcement efforts by the Securities
and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), prosecutors, and private
plaintiffs, which focus largely on firms, are ineffective and costly.'
See, e.g., Securities Class Action Filings 2008: A Year in Review 22, fig. 22,
RESEARCH, available at http://securities.stanford.edulclearinghouse
research/2008_YIR/20090106_YIRO8_FulLReport.pdf/ (reporting that 82% of class
actions allege misrepresentations in financial statements and 58% GAAP violations);
see also Robert B. Thompson & Hillary A. Sale, Securities Fraud as Corporate
Governance: Reflections upon Federalism, 56 VAND. L. REV. 859, 898-900 (2003). In
part, this is the result of PLSRA's safe-harbor for forward-looking statements, i.e., the
requirement that plaintiff prove that defendant had actual knowledge that the
forward-looking statement was wrong, which lowers the relative share of securities
frauds that are not accounting frauds. See Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 21E, 15
U.S.C. § 78u-5(c)(1)(b) (1934).
2 See sources cited infra note 5.
3 See RICHARD A. POSNER, EcONoMIc ANALYSIS OF LAw 450-52 (7th ed. 2007)
(describing different mechanisms for preventing corporate fraud and finding problems
with each). Although the number of large-scale accounting frauds has declined since
2002, accounting fraud remains common by any metric: measured by the number of
restatements, filed lawsuits alleging accounting fraud, or initiated investigations. See
Stephen Taub, The State of Restatements: Sharply Falling, CFO, Mar. 10, 2009,
(reporting that in 2008 alone, 869
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/13270658
companies filed restatements, which represents 31.4% decline in financial
restatements compared with 2007). Despite the decline, the number of restatements in
2008 still exceeds the numbers filed in 2001, 2002, and 2003. See U.S. Financial
Restatements Down Almost a Third in 2008, SEEKING ALPHA (Feb. 18, 2009),
http://seekingalpha.com/article/121298-u-s-financial-restatements-down-almost-athird-in-2008/.
For example, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 vastly increased the maximum
criminal penalties for securities fraud. See, e.g., H.R. 3763, 107th Cong. § 1106 (2002)
(increasing penalties for individuals from $1 million fine and maximum ten year
prison sentence to $5 million fine and twenty year prison sentence, and for firms from
$2.5 million fine to maximum $25 million).
I See, e.g., Janet Cooper Alexander, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions,
48 STAN. L. REV. 1487, 1489-90 (1996) (arguing that damages in securities fraud class
actions are inefficient); Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate
Criminal Liability, 23 J. LEG. STUD. 833, 835-38 (1994) (arguing that vicarious liability
for crimes committed by firm's employees may reduce firm's incentive to prevent
wrongdoing); Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on
CORNERSTONE
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Firms are vicariously liable (civilly and criminally) for intentional
wrongs that their employees commit, even where the firm made every
effort to prevent wrongdoing.6 Vicarious corporate liability overdeters
by holding firms liable for employees' wrongs that would have been
inefficient to prevent, detect, and sanction,' while at the same time
supplying firms with perverse incentives.' The better the firm's
internal compliance mechanism, the more fraud it will detect, thereby
increasing the firm's potential liability.
More problematically, while vicarious corporate liability causes
firms to overpay for accounting fraud, it fails to deter responsible
individuals.' Although the law imposes liability on individuals for the
accounting fraud, individuals are rarely individually sanctioned."
With the exception of criminal prosecutions, firms (and indirectly

Securities Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 694-95 (1992)
(arguing that vicarious liability for securities fraud transfers wealth from one group of
innocent investors to another similar group without performing any useful social
function); John C. Coffee, Jr., Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on
Deterrence and Its Implementation, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1534, 1534-38 (2006)
[hereinafter Coffee, Reforming Securities Class Action] (arguing that securities fraud
class actions neither compensate victims nor deter wrongdoing); Donald C.
Langevoort, Capping Damages for Open-Market Securities Fraud, 38 ARIz. L. REv. 639,
639-41 (1996) [hereinafter Langevoort, Capping Damages] (proposing capped
damages for securities fraud because damages equal to out-of-pocket losses are grossly
disproportionate to harm suffered); A.C. Pritchard, Markets as Monitors: A Proposal to
Replace Securities Class Actions with Exchanges as Securities Fraud Enforcers, 85 VA. L.
REV. 925, 927-30 (1999) [hereinafter Pritchard, Markets as Monitors] (proposing to
replace costly and ineffective securities fraud class actions with monitoring by stock
exchanges); A.C. Pritchard, Who Cares?, 80 WASH. U. L.Q. 883, 883-84 (2002)
(arguing that securities fraud class actions are poor deterrents for fraud).
6 See Arlen & Carney, supra note 5, at 696 & n.22.
See Langevoort, Capping Damages, supra note 5, at 657; Amanda M. Rose,
Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring the RelationshipBetween Public and
PrivateEnforcement of Rule 1Ob-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301, 1332-33 (2008).
8 See Arlen, supra note 5, at 836 ("Increased enforcement expenditures reduce
the number of agents who commit crimes by increasing the probability of
detection . . . [but they] also increase the probability that the government will detect
those crimes that are committed.").
9 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156 U.
PA. L. REv. 229, 305 (2007).
10 Coffee reports that filing a securities fraud class action raises the likelihood of
CEO turnover from 9.8% to 23.4%. Coffee, Reforming Securities Class Action, supra
note 5, at 1554 & n.77. Enforcement actions (SEC and DOJ) have a higher likelihood
of resulting in termination, close to 90%, but a low probability of penalties beyond
termination. See Jonathan Karpoff, D. Scott Lee & Gerald S. Martin, The Consequences
to Managers for Financial Misrepresentation, 88 J. FIN. EcoN. 195, 201 (2008)
[hereinafter Karpoff et al., Consequences to Managers].
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their shareholders) and their insurers bear almost the entire burden of
liability for accounting fraud."
The dominant argument in favor of holding firms vicariously liable
for fraud is that vicarious liability lowers enforcement costs and serves
as an indirect means to sanction dishonest employees." Firms have
superior information about fraud and, thus, can sanction dishonest
employees at lower cost than external enforcers, such as the SEC or
private litigants." The argument assumes that liable firms will shift
liability to those responsible."
But, liability shifting for accounting fraud rarely happens" because
sanctioning is costly for firms and because agency problems and legal
restrictions impede internal sanctioning.16 Top management is
" See Coffee, Reforming Securities Class Action, supra note 5, at 1550-51; Karpoff
et al., Consequences to Managers, supra note 10, at 201 & tbl.3, 210 & tbl.8 (reporting
that culpable employees identified in SEC or DOJ investigations lose their jobs, but
most suffer no additional consequences other than cease-and-desist order). Criminal
enforcement remains rare compared with the numbers of SEC enforcement actions or
securities fraud class actions. See Jonathan Karpoff, D. Scott Lee & Gerald S. Martin,
The Cost to Firms of Cooking the Books, 43 J. FIN. & QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 581, 588

(2008) [hereinafter Karpoff et al., Costs to Firms] (reporting that between 1978 and
2006, SEC filed civil proceedings for accounting fraud against 429 firms and 1730
individuals and administrative proceedings against 297 firms and 815 individuals; in
comparison, DOJ brought criminal proceedings against 41 firms and 558 individuals).
12 See, e.g., Arlen, supra note 5, at 835; Donald C. Langevoort, On Leaving
Corporate Executives "Naked, Homeless and Without Wheels": Corporate Fraud,
Equitable Remedies, and the Debate Over Entity and Individual Liability, 42 WAKE FOREST
L. REv. 627, 630 (2007) [hereinafter Langevoort, Naked, Homeless, and Without
Wheels].
13 See Arlen, supranote 5, at 835.
" The firms can shift liability by requiring culpable individuals to indemnify the
firm or by withholding employment-related benefits, including promotions. See id. at
835-36.
15 The statement is entirely accurate for corporate management and less so for
lower-echelon employees. But, no empirical studies to date have compared liability
shifting within firms between different classes of employees. Karpoff and his
collaborators find that culpable non-executive employees are more likely to lose their
jobs than are executives. Furthermore, the authors do not report evidence on intrafirm
sanctions other than termination. See Karpoff et al., Consequences to Managers, supra
note 10, at 201-02; see also Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Should the Behavior of Top
Management Matter?, 91 GEO. L.J. 1215, 1254 (2003) [hereinafter Khanna, Behavior of
Top Management] (observing that when transaction costs are positive and bargaining
between management and corporation not at arm's length, firms cannot easily shift
liability to management); Pritchard, Who Cares?, supra note 5, at 887 ("The settlement
process [in securities fraud class actions] leaves us with a scheme of exclusively
vicarious corporate liability.").
" See Arlen, supra note 5, at 835; Khanna, Behavior of Top Management, supra note
15, at 1254. By "legal restrictions," I mean statutory indemnification provisions and
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involved in the vast majority of earnings manipulations. Top
management, ex officio, also influences the firm's decision on whether
to settle a claim or enforcement action, the content of that settlement,
and the decision to sanction internally." In addition, indemnification
statutes and standard directors' and officers' ("D&O") insurance
policies further insulate management from liability unless it is shown
that they failed to "act[] in good faith and in a manner [they]
reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the best interests of the
corporation."' 8
When the firm has no incentive to sanction management (because
the firm is vicariously liable whether it sanctions culpable individuals
or not, and sanctioning itself is costly to the firm), and when the
responsible individuals participate in the process designed to
determine the appropriate sanction, low rates of liability shifting to
dishonest managers are not surprising.19 This is problematic because
without liability shifting or without external individual liability, moral
hazard causes individuals, usually top managers, to engage in
excessive wrongdoing. Ultimately, vicarious liability for accounting
fraud does not require individual wrongdoers to internalize the costs
of fraud and does little to reduce its incidence.
Proposals to modify the current liability regime - damage caps,20
regulatory penalties instead of damages," SEC screening of securities
contractual limits on clawbacks, etc. By "agency problems," I mean the ability of
insiders to influence the likelihood that they will be caught and sanctioned, including
their ability to shape the substance of any settlement agreement with the SEC, private
plaintiffs, or criminal prosecutors.
17 Firms' efforts to recoup payments made to dishonest managers have been
largely unsuccessful. See Phred Dvorak & Serena Ng, Check, Please: Reclaiming Pay
from Executives Is Hard To Do, WALL ST.J., Nov. 20, 2006, at Al; Joann Lublin & Scott
Thurm, How To Fire a CEO: More Bosses Are Getting the Boot, But it's Harder to Sack
Them Without Payingfor the Privilege, WALL ST.J., Oct. 30, 2006, at Bl, B3.
18 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §145(a) (2009). Although one would expect that insurers
would effectively police fraud, this does not happen. Since the firm pays the policy
premium, and not the managers, insurers profit by charging higher premia and
reducing monitoring costs. See Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, The Missing Monitor in
Corporate Governance: The Directors' & Officers' Liability Insurer, 95 GEo. LJ. 1795,
1800 (2007) (concluding that managers buy D&O insurance for self-serving reasons,
and that coverage fails to control for moral hazard).
" Similarly, there is little evidence criminals often volunteer for detection and
punishment.
20 See Langevoort, CappingDamages, supra note 5, at 641.
21 See Alexander, supra note 5, at 1508-14; Pritchard, Markets as Monitors, supra
note 5, at 983 (proposing that exchanges impose penalties instead of private
damages). Alexander proposes that both firms and individuals pay regulatory penalties
and that penalties against individuals be made uninsurable. But, in order to sanction
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class actions,22 and, more radically, eliminating corporate liability for
securities fraud altogether - have largely ignored the deterrence
disparity between firms and managers. Although these proposals
would reduce the perverse incentives for firms and alleviate the
overdeterrence problem, none increases the probability that individual
fraudsters will be detected and sanctioned.
This Article proposes an alternative regime that addresses both
concerns, overdeterrence of firms and underdeterrence of managers:
leveraged sanctions.2 5 A leveraged sanction is a sanction that is
threatened against the firm or a group of insiders. The firm (or the
group) can reduce or avoid sanction by divulging information to
external enforcers. The threat of sanction provides the leverage needed
to overcome agency problems and increases the likelihood that the
firm will share information with external enforcers, who will, in turn,
sanction dishonest managers where appropriate.26 Although firms can
and do fire dishonest managers, they do it largely in response to a

individuals, the regulator must know their identity and the nature of their
involvement. Without the firm's cooperation, the regulator will likely be able to
sanction only a few unlucky managers.
21 See Rose, supra note 7, at 1301.
23 See Arlen & Carney, supra note 5, at 720; Coffee, Reforming Securities
Class
Action, supra note 5, at 1582-84; Daniel R. Fischel & Alan 0. Sykes, CorporateCrime,
25 J. LEGAL STUD. 319, 321 (1996) (concluding that corporate criminal liability in
addition to corporate civil liability produces overdeterrence ex ante and excessive
investment in litigation ex post); V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What
Purpose Does it Serve?, 109 HARv. L. REv. 1477, 1493-96, 1532-34 (1996) [hereinafter
Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability] (concluding that corporate criminal liability
serves no purpose).
2 See, e.g., Rose, supra note 7, at 1303 (mentioning deterrence dichotomy
between firms and individuals, but ignoring it in rest of analysis).
25 1 am not the first to use the term "leverage" to describe the threat of liability
imposed on groups for crimes committed by individuals within those groups. See, e.g.,
Albert W. Alschuler, Two Ways To Think About the Punishment of Corporations, 46 AM.
CRIM. L. REv. 1359, 1370 (2009) (noting that corporate criminal liability manufactures
leverage of prosecutors over corporate managers); William S. Laufer, Corporate
Liability, Risk Shifting, and the Paradox of Compliance, 52 VAND. L. REv. 1343, 1348-49
(1999) (arguing that prosecutors "leverage indictments" of individuals in exchange for
civil and administrative actions against firms); Daryl J. Levinson, Collective Sanctions,
56 STAN. L. REv. 345, 378 (2003) (arguing that collective sanctions can "leverage"
solidarity of groups to induce intra-group monitoring).
6 See John C. Coates IV, The Goals and Promise of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 21 J.
EcoN. PERSP. 91, 95 (2007) ("The ability of [the SEC] to raise the perceived odds of
detection is also limited by information constraints."). In addition, more information
will enable external enforcers to sanction managers more accurately and distinguish
between honest mistakes and intentional fraud.
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regulatory or criminal action. 27 But, termination is not an effective
deterrent when managers commit accounting fraud to avoid being
fired for poor performance.' External enforcers are able to sanction
individuals more thoroughly than the firm, by imposing damages,
fines, or restitution, by barring them from serving as officers or
directors in the future, and by imprisonment. Leveraged sanctions will
increase detection and individual sanctioning by combining the firm's
cheaper access to information with external enforcers' superior
sanctioning.
The Article does not address optimal deterrence (impossible in any
system where most actions settle), but is concerned instead with
improving the effectiveness of liability for accounting fraud. By
increasing the expected cost of fraud, leveraged sanctions reduce fraud
without simultaneously increasing private costs of compliance for
non-offenders.30 Currently, federal prosecutors operate under a regime
that is similar to leveraged sanctions, although criminal law potentially
poses constitutional and policy problems absent from civil liability,
such as the individual's right to remain silent.3 ' But, criminal
27 Coffee reports that filing a securities fraud class action raises the likelihood of
CEO turnover from 9.8% to 23.4%. See Coffee, Reforming Securities Class Action, supra
note 5, at 1554 & n.77. Enforcement actions (SEC and DOJ) have a higher likelihood
of resulting in termination, close to 90%. See Karpoff et al., Consequences to Managers,
supra note 10, at 201 & tbl.3.
28 See Arlen & Carney, supra note 5, at 702-03.
29 Eliot Spitzer and Professors Frank Partnoy and William Black proposed public
disclosure of A.I.G. internal correspondence both to determine if anyone should be
held liable and to prevent a similar calamity from happening again. See Eliot Spitzer,
Frank Partnoy & William Black, Show Us the E-Mail, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.con2009/12/20/opinion/20partnoy.html?hp/.
I Since accounting fraud is an intentional crime, it is relatively easy for
individuals to avoid. In addition, under a leveraged sanctions regime, firms can reduce
or avoid liability ex post, simply by providing all pertinent information. See also
Reinier H. Kraakman, CorporateLiability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Controls, 93
YALE L.J. 857, 878 (1984).
3' See Brandon L. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, 93 VA. L. REv. 853, 855
(2007); see, e.g., Brandon L. Garrett, Coerced Confessions, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 917,
918-19 (2009) (arguing that confessions by corporations put individual employees in
precarious position where they must decide between potentially inculpating
themselves and discipline); Lisa Kern Griffin, Compelled Cooperation and the New
Corporate Criminal Procedure, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 311, 353-55 (2007) (arguing that
deferred prosecution agreements for fraud jeopardize individual employee's
constitutional rights). Although individuals are targeted significantly more often by
criminal law enforcement than by civil enforcers, firm-level sanctions are rarely
waived entirely under the deferred-prosecution regime. In addition to fines against
firms, most deferred-prosecution agreements focus on implementing structural
reforms and improving internal compliance.
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prosecutions are much rarer than civil actions. Employing leveraged
sanctions through private litigation and SEC regulatory actions is
likely to produce higher levels of individual deterrence.
Part I supplies background information on the current liability
regime for accounting fraud and the ongoing debate over its
effectiveness. While all commentators address the overdeterrence
problem, they fail to address adequately the problem of individual
underdeterrence.
Part II explains how the characteristics of accounting fraud limit the
deterrent effects of vicarious corporate liability, individual liability,
and other proposals. In addition to raising maximum penalties, the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act and recent enforcement efforts have largely
focused on improving internal compliance systems, which only
modestly reduce the frequency and duration of accounting fraud.
Some internal compliance measures are necessary to prevent easily
avoided, plain-vanilla frauds. External audits will detect a few more
accounting frauds. A better way to reduce the incidence of fraud is to
increase the expected cost to culpable individuals by increasing the
probability of sanctioning, and not the level of punishment.
Part III provides a theoretical model of leveraged sanctions. It
explains why leveraged sanctions, either when threatened against the
group with superior information or the firm, are likely to provide
superior deterrence to the alternative liability regimes explored in Part
II, and lists conditions under which a superior outcome is likely.
Finally, Part IV discusses practical implications of the leveraged
sanctions model. It suggests how sanctions could best be implemented
to deter cost-effectively accounting fraud, both by the SEC and by
private plaintiffs.
1.

CURRENT DEBATE

This Part begins by describing the effectiveness of current liability

regimes and continues with an evaluation of the current debate about
best mechanisms for sanctioning fraud. Commentators agree that
current enforcement efforts are ineffective and costly and have
proposed several changes." While these proposals address the
overdeterrence problem, all fail to address the problem of individual
underdeterrence.
32 See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002);
Arlen & Carney, supra note 5, at 714-16; Coffee, Reforming Securities Class Action,
supra note 5, at 1562-63 & n.103.
3
See sources cited infra Part I.B.
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A. Enforcement of Accounting Fraud
Currently, three major groups of external agents share
enforcement:3 4 private plaintiffs, the SEC, and federal and state
prosecutors. Although all three groups can deter fraud, the defendants
they target and the liability regimes they employ are somewhat
different.
Individuals "almost never contribute personally to settlements"" in
securities fraud class actions, even though they are often named as
defendants. 6 Instead, the firm and the liability insurer pay the bulk of
the settlement amounts." The SEC targets individual defendants more
frequently, but nevertheless settles most cases and imposes only
minor, if any, sanctions on individuals. While the efforts of private
plaintiffs and the SEC focus on firms, prosecutors pursue both firms
and individual wrongdoers within firms. Federal prosecutors usually
avoid indicting corporations for accounting fraud and instead
or
("DPA")
prosecution agreement
a deferred
negotiate
nonprosecution agreement ("NPA"). Agreements often require firms
to cooperate in the investigation of individuals. Although individuals
3
Firms do "enforce" prohibitions against fraud internally by terminating culpable
individuals. But, their efforts are sporadic and made overwhelmingly in response to an
external enforcement action. Hence, internal enforcement without the threat of
externally imposed sanctions plays only a minimal role in deterring fraud. See Karpoff
et al., Consequences to Managers, supra note 10, at 201 & tbl.3 (reporting that firms
terminated approximately one-third of dishonest employees before SEC began its
investigation).
3
Alexander, supra note 5, at 1499.
36 See Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins & Michael Klausner, Outside Director
Liability, 58 STAN. L. REv. 1055, 1102-04 (2006) (explaining that plaintiffs have
financial incentive to settle quickly and drop suits against individual defendants);
Coffee, Reforming Securities Class Action, supra note 5, at 1550-51 (pointing out that
plaintiffs sue individual defendants to access their insurance coverage, and not to hold
them individually liable).
See Coffee, Reforming Securities Class Action, supra note 5, at 1550 (reporting
3
that liability insurers pay on average 68.2% of settlement and defendant corporation
pays 31.4%).
3 See Donald Langevoort, Criminalization of Corporate Law: The Impact on
Director and Officer Behavior, 2 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 89, 90 (2007) [hereinafter
Langevoort, The Impact on Director and Officer Behavior] (observing that SEC has "not
always gone aggressively after the individuals as opposed to the company" and has
generally not sought disgorgement from individuals, even though it has ability to do
so). In addition, the SEC is more likely to pursue small firms, even though accounting
fraud is more prevalent among large firms. See Patricia M. Dechow, Weili Ge, Chad R.
Larson & Richard G. Sloan, PredictingMaterial Accounting Misstatements, AAA 2008
FIN. ACCT. & REPORTING SEC. (FARS) PAPER 15, at 50 & tbl.2A, available at
http//ssrn.com/abstract=997483.
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are relatively more likely to be sanctioned for fraud in cases where
there is a criminal investigation, individual criminal liability remains
rare in absolute terms because criminal investigations overall are rare
(compared to SEC enforcement actions and private securities fraud
litigation).3

All three groups of external enforcement agents rely on vicarious or
respondeat superior corporate liability for fraud committed by the
firm's employees. The firm is liable regardless of its own "fault," as
measured by ineffective internal monitoring, and regardless of what it
has done to prevent, detect, or sanction fraud. Many commentators
view criminal fraud prosecutions as a departure from vicarious
corporate liability because firms can avoid indictment by cooperating
with the prosecutors.' But, an examination of DPAs and NPAs
suggests that the only sanction the firm avoids by cooperating is
indictment. Most agreements include significant fines and require
firms to conduct major structural reforms."1 Indictment can mean the
firm's liquidation, so firms will do almost anything to avoid it. Also,
indictment produces significant collateral consequences to innocent
42
shareholders, employees, creditors, customers, and communities.
Prosecutors often use the threat of indictment against the firm as
leverage to obtain information about individual wrongdoers, lowering
investigation costs and increasing the likelihood that culpable
individuals are criminally sanctioned. Although criminal actions
increase individual deterrence, they contribute to the overdeterrence
of firms.

" See James D. Cox & Randal S. Thomas with Dana Kiku, SEC Enforcement
Heuristics: An Empirical Inquiry, 53 DUKE L.J. 737, 763 (2003) (observing that fewer
than 15% of firms that settle securities class action also face SEC enforcement action);
Karpoff et al., Consequences to Managers, supra note 10, at 210 & tbl.8. (finding that of
2206 individuals identified in SEC enforcement actions 617 were also subject to
criminal indictment).
' See, e.g., Miriam H. Baer, Insuring CorporateCrime, 83 IND. L.J. 1035, 1042-43
(2008) (proposing abolishing corporate liability for fraud and replacing it with
insurance).
41 See, e.g., Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, supra note 31, at 853; Patrick J.
Gnazzo, Remarks on "The Challenge of Cooperation: Consideration of the Ethical and
Managerial Implications or the Organizational Sentencing Guidelines, Thompson
Memorandum, SOX, Etc," 44 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1441, 1441-45 (2007) (describing costs
of deferred prosecution agreement for Computer Associates, Inc. and compliance
measures firm put in place after fraud - AEP Energy Services, Inc. DPA ($30 million
fine); America Online, Inc. DPA ($150 million fine of which $60 million is penalty);
Computer Associates DPA ($225 million payment to shareholders in addition to other
fines); PNC ICLC Corp. ($90 million); KPMG DPA ($456 million)).
42 See Griffin, supra note 31, at 319-20.
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Both enforcement regimes, securities fraud class actions and
criminal prosecutions, have been subject to much criticism. Those
who study securities fraud class actions lament that securities
litigation neither compensates the victims nor deters fraud. Those
who study criminal prosecutions for accounting fraud generally
complain that criminal enforcement overdeters both individuals and
firms and imposes significant costs on the shareholders without a
corresponding benefit." But, their proposed solutions - tweaks to
vicarious corporate liability or a shift to individual liability alone are unlikely to provide effective deterrence because they continue to
rely on unrealistic assumptions about the causes of accounting fraud,
or the ability of the firm to monitor, prevent, and sanction fraud.
However, specific characteristics of accounting fraud make it
particularly difficult to prevent and sanction by relying on either of the
two conventional liability regimes.
B. CurrentDebate About Liabilityfor Fraud
The current debate on optimal liability for accounting fraud has
several strands: some argue that the market itself will eliminate fraud,
others argue that vicarious corporate civil or criminal liability are
inefficient, and another group rejects any liability for fraud.
Judge Frank Easterbrook and Professor Daniel Fischel have
famously argued that a rule against securities fraud is unnecessary.46
Since investors can choose to invest in assets other than corporate
stock, managers have the incentive to assure investors of their honesty
and avoid fraud.4 ' Although theoretically appealing, their market
solution suffers from serious problems. There is far too much noise in
capital markets for investors to be able to discern high-quality
assurances of honesty from those of low quality.48 Furthermore,
" See generally Coffee, Reforming Securities Class Action, supra note 5, at 1545-56
and sources cited therein (arguing that securities fraud class actions do not
compensate victims for fraud nor deter wrongdoers).
See Larry E. Ribstein, Market vs. Regulatory Responses to Corporate Fraud: A
Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 28 J. CORP. L. 1, 36-39 (2002) [hereinafter
Ribstein, A Critique of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act] (arguing that executives will be overly
cautious because of increased criminal liability); sources cited supra note 7 and
accompanying text.
" See infra in Part 11.
4 See Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Mandatory Disclosure and the
Protection of Investors, 70 VA. L. REV. 669, 676 (1984).

" See id. at 673-76.
See Mitu Gulati, When Corporate Managers Fear a Good Thing Is Coming to an
End, 46 UCLA L. REV. 675, 696 (1999) (noting "low levels of direct information in the
4
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Easterbrook and Fischel seem to have initial private offerings in mind
and not the secondary market. Investors in an initial private offering
are buying stock directly from the firm and its managers. Investors
trading on the secondary market, on the other hand, do not
communicate with management. In addition, managers do not benefit
directly from trading among investors on the secondary market,
except to the extent that share prices increase and their compensation
is linked to share prices. They generally have little incentive to commit
fraud, except when they fear they might be terminated for
disappointing performance. In that period, managers do have an
incentive to withhold accurate information about firm performance
and, thereby, inflate the value of the firm to save their jobs this quarter
(and hope the firm does well in the next quarter, thus, enabling them
to conceal the misstatement).9 Easterbrook and Fischel fail to
anticipate this situation and, as a result, fail to address deterrence of
individuals. Finally, there is evidence that investors do not accurately
judge the honesty of managers and are prone to behavioral biases.50
This further reduces the ability of markets to police accounting fraud.
As a result, in a world without a rule against securities fraud, one
would expect to see a lot more fraud, contrary to Easterbrook and
Fischel's prediction."
Professors Larry Ribstein" and Jonathan Macey," similarly, have
argued that regulation and fraud enforcement are not cost-effective
and produce inefficient outcomes. They contend that market sanctions
for fraud will deter fraud more efficiently than ineffective and costly
regulation or enforcement." Although markets sanction accounting
marketplace about the performance of corporate managers").
" See Arlen & Carney, supra note 5, at 702-03. Managers benefit not only from
higher stock prices that result from undiscovered fraud, but also enjoy continued job
security because the firm appears healthier than it, in fact, is. See Robert A. Prentice,
The Inevitability of a Strong SEC, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 775, 825 (2006).
o See Patricia M. Dechow & Douglas J. Skinner, EarningsManagement: Reconciling
the Views of Accounting Academics, Practitioners,and Regulators 8 (Soc. Sci. Research
Network, Working Paper, 2000), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=218959; see also
Prentice, supra note 49, at 825 & n.310.
51 Cf. Coates, supra note 26, at 106 (reporting systemic effects of fraud before
increased enforcement following accounting fraud scandals).
52 See Ribstein, A Critiqueof the Sarbanes-OxleyAct, supra note 44, at 47-53.
5
See JONATHAN MACEY, CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 50 (2008) (listing among
effective corporate governance mechanisms market for corporate control, insider
trading, and short selling, and among ineffective mechanisms, SEC enforcement and
securities litigation). He does acknowledge that last period problems, for example,
may justify some form of fault-based liability. See id. at 129.
1 See id.; Ribstein, A Critiqueof the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, supra note 44, at 49-50.
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fraud, most of the costs will be borne by investors and not by the
individuals who commit fraud. Ultimately, investors may respond by
taking their money out of the stock market and reducing capital
formation." Although Ribstein and Macey are correct that the costs of
regulation and enforcement are nontrivial, empirical evidence does not
support their assertion that enforcement of fraud is inefficient, i.e.,
that the marginal costs for enforcing accounting fraud generally
exceed the marginal benefits of reduced fraud, nor do they explain
how markets will effectively penalize individuals who commit fraud.56
A second group of commentators concedes that liability for fraud is
necessary, but has argued that unlimited vicarious corporate civil
liability imposes inefficient sanctions on firms and, thereby, overdeters
firms.5 ' To reduce the problem of overdeterrence, commentators have
proposed capping damages in securities fraud class actions," replacing
damages with regulatory fines," requiring an SEC screen before a
securities class action can proceed,60 shifting liability to auditors, t
See Prentice, supra note 49, at 825.
Although many commentators have assumed that fraud is a zero-sum event,
many empirical studies suggest that this is not the case. Not only does fraud have
systemic financial-market effects, depressing returns for all firms, it produces real
economic costs: inefficient production levels, short-term cost-cutting by competitors,
etc. See, e.g., Merle Erickson, Michelle Hanlon & Edward L. Maydew, How Much Will
Firms Pay for Earnings that Do Not Exist? Evidence of Taxes Paid on Allegedly Fraudulent
Earnings, 79 AccT. REV. 387, 389-90 (2004) (reporting that out of twenty-seven firms
subject to SEC enforcement actions, fifteen paid taxes on overstated earnings; total
amount of taxes paid represented 2.4% of firms' market value and 20% of pretax value
of overstated earnings); Karpoff et al., Costs to Firms, supra note 11, at 581 (reporting
that reputational sanctions that capital markets impose for fraud significantly exceed
amount of fraud and conclude that financial honesty is particularly valuable asset for
firms); Gil Sadka, The Economic Consequences of Accounting Fraud in Product Markets:
Theory and a Casefrom the U.S. Telecommunications Industry (WorldCom), 8 AM. LAW
& EcoN. REV. 439, 439-40, (2006) (showing that accounting fraud at WorldCom
caused its competitors to make inefficient investment decisions); Oren Bar-Gill &
Lucian A. Bebchuk, Misreporting Corporate Performance 4 (Harv. L. & Econ.
Discussion, Paper No. 400, 2002), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=354141
(reporting that accounting fraud has not only distributive effects, but gives rise to
significant efficiency costs and distorts "allocative role of capital markets").
" See Alexander, supra note 5, at 1498; Coffee, Reforming Securities Class Action,
supra note 5, at 1536-37; Langevoort, Capping Damages, supra note 5, at 641; Rose,
supra note 7, at 1322-23.
* See Langevoort, Capping Damages, supra note 5, at 641-42.
* See Alexander, supra note 5, at 1508-14; Pritchard, Markets as Monitors, supra
note 5, at 983 (proposing penalties instead of damages to be imposed by exchanges
instead of individual plaintiffs).
' See Rose, supra note 7, at 1301.
61 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Gatekeeper Failure and Reform:
The Challenge of
5

56
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and, finally, eliminating corporate civil liability altogether and
replacing it with individual liability 62 or insurance." Although firms
may be overdeterred, the penalties for fraud are not too large, just
misplaced.' There is mounting evidence that the costs of fraud are
significant and largely borne by third persons, not just the
shareholders who bought shares during class period. CompetitorS6 5
and employees,6 6 for example, often bear some of the costs of
accounting fraud, yet lack standing to recover. Instead, overdeterrence
is the result of the firms' inability to prevent fraud and to shift liability
to culpable individuals, usually top managers who benefit from
accounting fraud.
Some commentators, including Professors Donald Langevoort and
John Coffee, have advocated more frequent civil and regulatory
sanctions for dishonest managers, instead of jail time. But, their
proposals do not resolve the information asymmetries among the
insiders, the firm, and external enforcers. 7 Without information about
who did what (most of which the insiders control) external enforcers
are usually unable to assign individual liability. As a result,
Langevoort's and Coffee's proposals would, at best, only marginally
increase individual deterrence.
A third group of commentators opposes vicarious corporate criminal
liability. They argue that vicarious corporate criminal liability makes it
Fashioning Relevant Reforms, 84 B.U. L. REV. 301, 349-53 (2004); Frank Partnoy,
Barbarians at the Gatekeepers?: A Proposal for a Modified Strict Liability Regime, 79
WASH. U. L.Q. 491, 540-46 (2001).
62 See Arlen & Carney, supra note 5, at 720; Coffee, Reforming Securities Class
Action, supranote 5, at 1582-84.
63 See Baer, Insuring CorporateCrime, supra note 40, at 1035.
6 Cf. Alexander, supra note 5, at 1498 ("Aggregate class trading losses are
probably greater than either the true net social cost of the violation or the benefits
received by the violator, both of which are speculative in nature and difficult to
calculate.").
65 See Sadka, supra note 56, at 439, 457-58. Sadka provides evidence that
WorldCom managers lowered prices to give the appearance of financial health to
conceal fraud. Because the telecommunications market was very competitive at the
time, WorldCom's pricing strategy forced its competitors to lower their prices also,
and squeezed their profit margins.
66 See id. at 458 (reporting that AT&T made bad investment decisions and fired
20,000 employees to remain competitive with WorldCom's fraudulent financials).
Karpoff and his collaborators report that a third of all fraudster firms enter
bankruptcy, resulting in job loss. See Karpoff et al., Costs to Firms, supra note 11, at
593. Unless employees are also shareholders, they - under current law - do not
have standing to sue for lost earnings.
67 See Coffee, Reforming Securities Class Action, supra note 5, at 1572-83;
Langevoort, Naked, Homeless, and Without Wheels, supra note 12, at 654-60.
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too easy to convict corporations and propose eliminating corporate
criminal liability," implementing fault-based liability' for firms, or
introducing affirmative defenses to corporate criminal liability.
Because corporate criminal liability is usually imposed in addition to
civil liability, there is a risk of "overdeterrence ex ante, and an
excessive investment of resources in litigation ex post."71 In addition,
Professors Assaf Hamdani and Alon Klement argue that corporate
criminal liability that threatens the existence of the firm reduces
deterrence by reducing incentives to monitor peers and by increasing
incentives to engage in wrongdoing.
Another line of argument addresses the balance between corporate
criminal and civil liability," arguing that criminal liability should be a
"last resort," used only when civil liability is insufficient.7 The
argument has a lot of appeal. Civil liability is ordinarily cheaper to
implement than criminal sanctions. It relies on private action (i.e.,
lawsuit by the injured individual) rather than government action.
Private parties will not sue unless the expected benefit of enforcement
exceeds the cost, so private enforcement may be more efficient
(assuming no collective action problems, externalities, etc.). The

6
See John Hasnas, The Centenary of a Mistake: One Hundred Years of Corporate
CriminalLiability, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1329, 1357 (2009).
6 See Geraldine Szott Moohr, Of Bad Apples and Bad Trees: Considering FaultBased Liabilityfor the Complicit Corporation, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1343, 1364 (2007)
[hereinafter Moohr, Of Bad Apples and Bad Trees].
70 See Ellen S. Podgor, A New CorporateWorld Mandates a "Good Faith"Affirmative
Defense, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1537, 1543 (2007); Andrew Weissmann & David
Newman, Rethinking Corporate Criminal Liability, 82 IND. L.J. 441, 449 (2007)
(arguing that government should have burden of proving that firm failed to adopt
effective procedures to prevent employee misconduct).
n Fischel & Sykes, supra note 23, at 321.
72 Hamdani and Klement develop a game-theoretic model of expected outcomes.
They conclude that a severe sanction which can be imposed only once can encourage
insiders to engage in wrongdoing. This is so because the firm liquidates when a single
individual commits a crime. If managers know that someone will eventually commit
fraud and destroy the firm, each manager will want to commit fraud first. See Assaf
Hamdani & Alon Klement, CorporateCrime and Deterrence, 61 STAN. L. REv. 271, 275
(2008).
" See Christine Hurt, The Undercivilization of Corporate Law, 33 J. CORP. L. 361,
445 (2008) (concluding that there exists "imbalance" between criminal and civil
enforcement in corporate law); Geraldine Szott Moohr, The Balance Among Corporate
Criminal Liability, Private Civil Suits, and Regulatory Enforcement, 46 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
1459, 1462 (2009) [hereinafter Moohr, Balance].
" Fischel & Sykes, supra note 23, at 321 (arguing that "the case for corporate
criminal liability must rest on the need to correct some deficiency in the system of
civil liability"); Moohr, Balance, supra note 73, at 1462.
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reasoning is appealing, and this Article adopts the preference for civil
sanctions over criminal, but the commentators do not focus on the
disparity between deterrence of firms versus deterrence of individuals
who commit fraud.75
Finally, commentators object to the (ab)use of corporate criminal
liability to secure criminal convictions and plea bargains by individual
wrongdoers.7' They argue that enlisting the firm to prosecute its
employees violates the employees' rights against compelled testimony
and undermines their right to counsel. 7 Professor Samuel Buell
convincingly rejects their arguments.7 ' He explains that suppressing
employees' statements made during internal investigations would
enable both the firm and its employees to avoid liability."
As currently employed, however, corporate criminal liability
combined with DPAs and NPAs is the only effective means to deter
managers from committing accounting fraud. This Article grants that
relying on criminal sanctions to deter fraud is both unpredictable and
costly, and proposes leveraged civil and regulatory sanctions against
firms or insiders as a preferred alternative.
II.

LIMITATIONS OF CORPORATE AND INDIVIDUAL LIABILITY

Currently, vicarious corporate liability is the dominant form of
liability in private and public enforcement actions. In addition, most
proposals detailed above, including capped damages, regulatory fines,
or SEC screening of private lawsuits, rely on vicarious corporate
liability.
Because of its dominance, this Part begins with a detailed analysis of
justifications for vicarious corporate liability and explains why each of
them is unpersuasive when applied to accounting fraud. This Part then
explains briefly why individual liability, without attendant corporate
liability, and most fault-based corporate liability regimes will
underdeter accounting fraud.

7 See Hurt, supra note 73, at 444 (discussing replacing criminal enforcement with
more private securities litigation, but failing to address at all how private lawsuits will
"provide discipline for corporate managers"); Moohr, Balance, supra note 73, at 1462.
76 See Baer, Insuring Corporate Crime, supra note 40, at 1045-48; Griffin, supra
note 31, at 329-31.
n See Griffin, supra note 31, at 361. But see Samuel W. Buell, Criminal Procedure
Within the Firm, 59 STAN. L. REV. 1613, 1646-50, 1655-57 (2007).
7 See Buell, supra note 77, at 1645.
7 Id.
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A. IncompleteJustificationsfor Vicarious CorporateLiability
Imposing liability on the firm for harm caused by its employees, in
theory, provides superior deterrence of employee misconduct because
it lowers the combined costs of misconduct and enforcement.' Firms
that are liable for their employees' misconduct have the incentive to
monitor and sanction their employees and may be able to do so at
lower cost than external enforcers." To the extent firms are able to
monitor, vicarious corporate liability can deter wrongdoing better than
individual liability.
However, vicarious corporate liability, particularly for intentional
acts, is efficient only if firm liability does not reduce employee
incentives to shun wrongful conduct. 2 This requires the firm to deter
wrongdoing ex ante through incentives directed at employees, to
discover efficiently and stop wrongdoing by monitoring employees, or
to sanction dishonest employees at lower cost than the government."
The following sections argue that vicarious corporate liability for
accounting fraud does not satisfy any of these requirements: it
underdeters managers and thereby produces inefficiently high levels of
wrongdoing. 4 Specifically, the ex ante incentives that firms can
provide their managers will rarely be effective when accounting fraud
is most likely to occur, and may increase managers' incentives to
commit fraud." Although an effective system of internal controls will
reduce the incidence of run-of-the-mill fraud, it will rarely catch the
most pernicious frauds and those involving the highest levels of
management. Similarly, the firms' ability to sanction managers is very

80 See Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An
Analysis of CorporateLiability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687, 692 (1997).
81 Id. at 696.
82 Alan 0. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic Analysis of the
Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARV. L. REV. 563, 588
(1988). Although the failure to shift liability for negligence will also reduce
employees' incentives to take care, intentional acts present a more serious problem.
Employees who commit intentional wrongs have the opportunity to decide whether to
commit the act and perform an actual cost-benefit analysis, not just an implicit one, as
is the case with negligence.
8 See Arlen, supra note 5, at 836; Arlen & Carney, supra note 5, at 707.
* See generally Arlen & Carney, supra note 5, at 734 (arguing that firm-level
liability will fail to deter fraud by managers who fear they will lose their jobs anyway
for poor performance).
85 Stock options, a common form of compensation, provide a good example.
Options are usually awarded annually and must vest within a specified period of time.
They provide powerful incentives to managers to increase the stock price (either
through good performance or fraud).
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limited. Firms can terminate managers who commit fraud,86 but
agency problems prevent firms from imposing additional sanctions
necessary to deter fraud effectively. Risk shifting, another rationale for
vicarious liability, borrowed from the law of negligence, also does not
justify corporate liability for accounting fraud. If the firm is liable for
fraud, but cannot shift liability to dishonest managers, vicarious
corporate liability creates moral hazard. Managers manipulate earnings
because they benefit from it. Unless the managers are forced to
internalize the costs of their own wrongdoing, they will commit more
fraud than socially desirable.
1. Bundled Incentives
Commentators have assumed that vicarious corporate liability will
reduce individual wrongdoing because firms are able to provide
superior ex ante incentives to employees, which can reduce the upside
of wrongdoing. It is necessary to distinguish the incentives which the
firm can provide to rank-and-file employees and managers. Firms can
provide managers long-term incentives like restricted stock awards,
which are believed to align managers' incentives with those of the
shareholders. Firms offer honest managers the potential for
advancement and continued affiliation with the firm's reputation.
They also can fire dishonest managers, terminating the benefits of
continued employment, both monetary and reputational.
The problem with ex ante incentives and incentive compensation,
however, is that it is difficult to tailor them to target specifically
accounting fraud, without undermining other goals of executive
compensation. Most managers will not manipulate earnings, but some
will. Professors Jennifer Arlen and William Carney identified the "last
period" problem as an important cause of accounting fraud.'
Managers are more likely to manipulate earnings when the firm's
results are disappointing and they fear their job is at risk." Those
caught might lose their job (e.g., nine out of ten managers named in
SEC or Department of Justice ("DOJ") enforcement actions for fraud
did indeed lose their jobs), but not all fraud is discovered, and not all
discovered fraud is subject to an enforcement action."o Although
See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
Coffee, Reforming Securities Class Action, supra note 5, at 1563 & n.103.
* Arlen & Carney, supra note 5, at 702-03.
8 Id. at 703. But, that also means that 10% kept their jobs even after the SEC or
DOJ investigated and sanctioned them for fraud.
* See Karpoff et al., Costs to Finns, supra note 11, at 586 (reporting that 40.2% of
restatements are followed by enforcement actions, and suggesting that although
86
1
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termination is a serious penalty, the threat of job loss provides limited
deterrence when the individual deciding whether to commit fraud
believes that her job is on the line anyway. 9' The same is true for
potential job advancement.
Incentive compensation like stock options or restricted stock can
increase managers' appetite to engage in accounting fraud because
"In]ecessarily, the manager acts within a shorter time frame than the
firm."92 Unless the firm pays its top managers nearly unlimited cash
salaries" (enabling them to live comfortable lives without having to
sell stock), 94 restricted stock and stock options must vest, usually
every year. The more options the firm grants its managers, the greater
the incentive to boost the stock price and the greater the incentive to
misrepresent earnings. Every vesting period thus becomes an
"[Clompensation contracts
opportunity for accounting fraud.
contingent on reported earnings cannot provide managers with the
incentive both to maximize profits and to report those profits
honestly."" Unless firms award incentive compensation after the
manager has lost the ability to control the firm's actions, there will
always be a period during a manager's employment when the manager
will have an incentive to boost results artificially."
Even if the size of the manager's compensation package is unrelated
to firm performance (an unlikely scenario), a manager of an ailing
firm has an incentive to commit fraud to preserve his job-specific
monetary and reputational benefits. Reporting disappointing earnings
number of firms that get "caught ... is not negligible," not all firms do).
91 See Arlen & Carney, supra note 5, at 702-03.
92 John C. Coffee, "No Soul To Damn, No Body To Kick": An Unscandalized Inquiry
into the Problem of CorporatePunishment, 79 MICH. L. REv. 386, 394 (1981).
9
Note that only $1 million of nonperformance based compensation is deductible
on the firm's taxes. See 26 U.S.C. § 162(m)(1) (2006).
9
Cf. Paul Sullivan, At Bonus Time, Less Appetite for Toys, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23,
2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/23/your-money/23wealth.html/ (describing
financial planning for bankers who will receive most of their compensation in form of
restricted stock).
9
But see Coffee, Reforming Securities Class Action, supra note 5, 1563 & n.103
(arguing that incentive compensation and stock options in particular can reduce
managers' incentives to engage in fraud).
96 Keith J. Crocker & Joel Slemrod, The Economics of Earnings Manipulation and
Managerial Compensation, 38 RAND J. EcoN. 698, 700 (2007). But see Chris
Armstrong, Alan D. Jagolinzer & David F. Larcker, Chief Executive Officer Equity
Incentives and Accounting Irregularities, 48 J. ACCT. RESEARCH 225, 227-28 (2010)
(arguing that high levels of equity incentives slightly reduce frequency of accounting
irregularities).
97
See Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 80, at 705 (observing that compensation
designed to reward performance also rewards profit-enhancing misconduct).

20111 Leverage, Sanctions, and Deterrence of Accounting Fraud

1301

would result in an immediate and certain harm to the manager's job
security and reputation. Although managers can and do hint to
analysts when earnings will disappoint, usually the market penalty for
missing an earnings target is significant." Fraud, although risky,
delays the harm to the manager and may avert it altogether if the fraud
is never discovered. Depending on the duration of fraud, the
manager's discount rate, her appetite for risk, and the perceived
likelihood of apprehension, accounting fraud may be appealing.99
Clawback provisions requiring managers to return any
compensation based on earnings later restated can reduce the
incentive for fraud.100 But, managers who knowingly overstate
earnings will also have advance warning of possible clawback. They
can hide or spend their compensation, effectively making themselves
judgment-proof if they are caught. 101
Alternately, firms that vest most of the compensation after the
manager leaves the firm can reduce the incentive to commit fraud. 102 if
conditioned on faithful service, compensation awarded after
employment with the firm (such as pensions) could induce managers
to stay honest. But, these post-employment payments also create moral
hazard problems of their own. A manager who expects to receive most
of her compensation after she leaves the firm will have an incentive to

" See Dechow & Skinner, supra note 50, at 8.
9 Dechow and her collaborators report "there are long-term benefits to building
reputations for providing reliable and timely disclosures. Yet the sample of firms
investigated . . . chose to risk (and ultimately lose) these benefits for the prospect of
short-term gain." Dechow et al., Causes and Consequences of Earnings Manipulation:An
Analysis of Firms Subject to Enforcement Actions by the SEC, 13 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 1,
31 (1996); see also Yair Listokin, Crime and (With a Lag) Punishment: The Implications
of Discountingfor Equitable Sentencing, 44 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 115, 115 (2007) (arguing
that because criminals discount ultimate sentence because of pre-conviction delays
and proposing that sentence terms be discounted to reflect delays).
100 Clawbacks have generally been used to describe "any action for recoupment of a
loss." Miriam A. Cherry & Jarrod Wong, Clawbacks: Prospective Contract Measures in
an Era of Excessive Executive Compensation and Ponzi Schemes, 94 MINN. L. REv. 368,
410 (2009); see Sarbanes-Oxley Act, § 304(a), 15 U.S.C. § 7243(a) (2006) (requiring
CFOs and CEOs to reimburse any bonuses received during twelve month period
preceding restatement for fraud, regardless of their own fault).
101For example, managers in Texas with unlimited homestead exemptions may
sink their compensation into large houses. Sarbanes-Oxley exempts fines imposed by
the SEC or criminal prosecutors from bankruptcy discharge, but creditors (like the
firm) cannot foreclose on the primary residence. See Tx. PROP. CODE ANN. H§ 41.001,
41.002 (West 2000).
102 Firms already provide severance packages and executive pensions. But, these
payments are a relatively small portion of executive's total compensation.

University of California,Davis

1302

[Vol. 44:1281

engage in activities that are more likely to result in termination. 10 3 in
addition, severance payments and large pensions are frequently the
source of shareholder ire, dubbed "payments for failure."'0 Justifying
even larger pensions or severance payments as an incentive for
managers to avoid committing accounting fraud is unlikely to be
popular with investors and policymakers alike.
As a result, the ability of the firm to lower the likelihood of
accounting fraud by tailoring employee incentives is very limited.
2.

Limited Monitoring

Vicarious corporate liability may nevertheless be desirable if firms
can monitor employee behavior more cheaply than external
enforcers.o' But, the firm's ability to monitor accounting fraud is
limited. o

Earnings manipulations overwhelmingly result from a decision by
top managers to fabricate results in order to satisfy and exceed
analysts' expectationso 7 (i.e., expectations that may have become
untethered from reality)"0 ' or to hide deteriorating performance.' 09
Dishonest managers fear that if they report disappointing earnings,
investors and stock analysts will closely scrutinize their
103 MACEY, supra note 53, at 25. Ideally, managers should strive to increase longterm value of the firm, rather than try to get terminated.
See, e.g., Jason Nissan, Clayton Hirst & Heather Tomlinson, Payments for Failure
'0
at 17 FTSE 100 Firms, INDEPENDENT, May 25, 2003, http://www.independent.co.uk/
news/business/news/payments-for-failure-at-17-ftse-100-firms-539048.html/ (discussing
shareholder proposals to ban golden parachutes at top U.K. firms).
10I See Arlen & Carney, supra note 5, at 715; Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability,
supra note 23, at 1495.
106 See Arlen & Carney, supra note 5, at 715.
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OF
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ORGANIZATIONS,

FRAUDULENT
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1987-1997, at 19-20 (1999), available at http://www.coso.org/publicationst
FFR_1987_1997.PDF/; Dechow, Ge, Larson, and Sloan, supra note 38, at 22; Prentice,
supra note 49, at 782 & n.34 (2006) (citing study by Committee of Sponsoring
Organizations which found that in frauds disclosed between 1987 and 1997, CEO,
CFO, or both were involved in five out of six cases).
108 Consider that Enron's peak valuation of $68 billion (in August 2001) effectively
required the company to increase its cash flow at 91% annually for the next six years,
(and then to grow at the average rate for the economy) - a pace that required it
continuously to come up with what were, in effect, one-time-only innovations. See
Joseph Fuller & Michael C. Jensen, Just Say No to Wall Street: Putting a Stop to the
EarningsGame, 14J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 41, 43 (2002).
'0
"A consistent theme among misstating firms appears to be that they have shown
strong performance prior to the misstatements and that the misstatements are made to
hide deteriorating performance." Dechow, Ge, Larson, and Sloan, supra note 38, at 5.
REPORTING:
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performance."o Managers might lose their jobs and associated
financial and reputational benefits."' Many accounting frauds are
accompanied by allegations of insider trading, suggesting that
managers manipulate reported earnings in order to "unload their
holdings at inflated prices."i12
Managerial over-optimism may also play a role in accounting
fraud."' Believing that past success predicts future success, top
managers will risk accounting fraud, perhaps rationalizing it as
"income smoothing."" 4 For example: "Enron's accounting games were
never meant to last forever . . ..

The goal was to maintain the

impression that Enron was humming until Skilling's next big idea
kicked in and started raking in real profits.""'
Managers who recognize revenue on products that have yet to be
manufactured," 6 or capitalize expenses instead of expensing them
immediately," 7 usually know that what they are doing is illegal." 8
no See Pritchard, Markets as Monitors, supra note 5, at 931.
'" See Arlen & Carney, supra note 5, at 702-03; Gulati, supra note 48, at 697-99
(arguing that high prestige associated with top managerial posts provides incentive for
managers to commit fraud).
If termination is the only sanction, and that sanction is applied in only a
percentage of cases, fraud may still be a gamble worth taking for the
corporate manager - she would likely find herself out of work, even if she
did not commit the fraud . . . . the threat of a class action lawsuit does little
to deter those wrongdoers ....

Pritchard, Who Cares?, supra note 5, at 887.
" Pritchard, Markets as Monitors, supra note 5, at 932-33.
See Douglas C. Langevoort, Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why
Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms), in
BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONoMICS 144, 149-50 (Cass Sunstein ed., 2000).
". Opinions on income smoothing vary, but the most innocuous define the
practice as making systematic choices within GAAP rules which produce reported
earnings that are smoother than underlying cash flows. See Dechow & Skinner, supra
note 50, at 4. Although income smoothing has become an accepted practice, it distorts
market prices. In finance theory, the price of stock is determined by the net present
value of future cash flows discounted by the firm's level of risk. Income smoothing
lowers income volatility and perceived risk (but does not lower actual risk) and
thereby artificially increases the market valuation of the stock. More perniciously, the
step from income smoothing to outright accounting fraud is very small. See id. at 5-8
(discussing managerial intent as crucial element that distinguishes income smoothing
from outright fraud).
115 BETHANY MCLEAN & PETER ELKIND, THE SMARTEST Guys IN THE RooM: THE
AMAZING RISE AND SCANDALOUS FALL OF ENRON 171 (2003).
116 See SEC v. Henke, 275 F. Supp. 2d 1075, 1079 (N.D. Cal. 2003).
11
See In re WorldCom, Inc., Sec. Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 628, 635 (S.D.N.Y 2004).
us See id. at 635; Henke, 275 F. Supp. 2d at 1079; Miriam H. Baer, Linkage and the
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Indeed, managers frequently go to great lengths to cover up their
crimes. They lie to their accountants," 9 threaten dismissal to those
who resist,' 20 reduce their prices to convey to competitors the
appearance of superior performance,"' and even pay taxes on
nonexistent earnings. 22
Vicarious corporate liability is usually justified as incentive for firms
to implement effective internal compliance systems to prevent and
detect fraud. But it is unclear that internal compliance efforts can deter
accounting fraud that involves top management,"' because managers
control compliance.124 Although financial statements sometimes raise
red flags (or should have raised them), smart managers are often able to
hide problems, particularly in industries with difficult-to-value assets.
More importantly, internal compliance systems are ordinarily
designed to alert management of their subordinates' wrongdoing, not
to discover management's own wrongdoing.1 6 In fact, Sarbanes-Oxley
requires management to implement internal control systems and to

Deterrence of Corporate Fraud, 94 VA. L. REV. 1295, 1311 (2008). And, if they do not
know that, they are not qualified to be managers.
"9 See, e.g., MCLEAN & ELKIND, supra note 115, at 128, 157-58 (describing
examples of deals where Enron executives misrepresented facts to its accountant,
Arthur Andersen).
120 Sherron Watkins and Cynthia Cooper, accountants at Enron and WorldCom,
respectively, brought accounting problems to the attention of management. Both were
threatened with termination and Watkins was reassigned. See Kathleen F. Brickey,
From Enron to WorldCom and Beyond: Life and Crime After Sarbanes-Oxley, 81 WASH.
U. L.Q. 357, 362-63, 369 (2003).
121 See Sadka, supra note 56, at 439, 457-58 (arguing that WorldCom fraud caused
price competition and not vice versa).
122 See Erickson et al., supra note 56, at 389-90 (reporting that out of twenty-seven
firms subject to SEC enforcement actions, fifteen paid taxes on overstated earnings;
total amount of taxes paid represented 2.4% of firms' market value and 20% of pretax
value of overstated earnings).
123 See Miriam Baer, Governing Corporate Compliance, 50 B.C. L. REV. 949, 950
(2009) (reporting that despite increased use and spending on internal compliance
systems, "employee malfeasance ... is on the rise").
124 See Fischel & Sykes, supra note 23, at 324-25 (observing that monitoring senior
management might be far more costly than monitoring rank-and-file employees).
125 See In re Cendant Corp., Admin. Proc. No. 3-10225, 54 S.E.C. 673, 677-78
(June 14, 2000); Partnoy, supra note 61, at 532 (observing that "accounting fraud can
be virtually impossible to detect").
126 See Toby J.F. Bishop & Frank E. Hydoski, Mapping Your FraudRisks, 87 HARV.
Bus. REv. Oct. 2009, at 76 ("Senior executives and directors need to be aware of their
companies' vulnerability to serious fraud, yet they may be out of the loop because risk
assessment is frequently handled further down the chain of command and captured in
voluminous, hard-to-penetrate spreadsheets and databases.").
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certify their effectiveness.127 While internal control systems may catch
lower-level fraud, there is little reason to believe that compliance
improves monitoring of top management itself.2 8
In effect, the board of directors is the ultimate monitor of top
management, yet it usually lacks the time, skill, and resources to
monitor and sanction fraud. Modern boards are overwhelmingly
independent. Formal independence reduces potential conflicts of
interest among board members and the firm, but also reduces the
quantity and quality of information available to the board. Virtually all
independent boards of directors rely largely on top executives, who
are often also co-directors, for information. It is usually top
management that presents the information to the board of directors
after reported wrongdoing. Management controls what information is
presented and how. It can withhold relevant information from the
board and present information in a favorable light to obtain the
necessary board cooperation.129
Some studies have found that firms with independent boards of
directors are less likely to manipulate earnings, suggesting that boards
of directors can provide some monitoring, but the effect is not
strong.130 In addition, because management usually hand-picks board
members, managers who are more likely to commit fraud will be more
likely to select lower-quality directors (assuming that managers
themselves know their own propensity for fraud). Finally, the effect of
vicarious corporate liability on monitoring over and above requiring

127 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act also requires firms to implement effective internal
controls over financial reporting.

[Ejach annual report . . . [must] contain an internal control report, which
shall - (1) state the responsibility of management for establishing and
maintaining an adequate internal control structure and procedures for
financial reporting; and (2) contain an assessment . . . [by management] of
the effectiveness of the internal control structure and procedures of the
issuer for financial reporting.
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. 107-204, § 404(a), 116 Stat. 745 (2002).
128 See Kimberly Krawiec, Cosmetic Compliance and the Failure of Negotiated
Governance, 81 WASH. U. L.Q. 487, 491-93 (2003).
129For example, the Enron board approved self-dealing transactions between
Andrew Fastow and off-the-books partnerships.
"n For a literature review, see Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain
Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm Performance,54 Bus. LAW. 921, 92122 (1999) (reporting that independent boards do not improve performance); Robert
A. Prentice & David B. Spence, Sarbanes-Oxley as Quack Corporate Governance: How
Wise Is Received Wisdom?, 95 GEO. L.J. 1843, 1869-70 & nn.127-28 (2007).
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independent boards and imposing individual director liability for
wrongdoing is unclear.
After Enron and WorldCom, audit committees were also redesigned
and empowered to investigate fraud. But, even the best audit
committees are ill equipped to catch willful accounting fraud. Although
audit committees usually have one or more experienced auditors (or
financial analysts) as members, their time is severely limited. Some
audit committees will coordinate their work with external auditors, but
most are not able to investigate the veracity of financial statements or
detect fraud before it has been exposed. To date, few studies have
found a positive correlation between the independence of the audit
committee and the incidence of accounting fraud.'
Even if vicarious corporate liability cannot guarantee better
monitoring by directors, it might be superior to individual liability if it
provides managers with superior incentives to monitor their peers.
One should expect this result if managers' pay is tied to corporate
performance. But, performance-linked pay is unlikely to produce
superior monitoring. Overstated earnings can lead to larger-thandeserved bonuses for all managers and reduce the managers' incentive
to monitor their peers. The effect is particularly strong when the firm
cannot clawback bonuses paid to "innocent" managers if the
accounting statements are later restated. 132
Even if we assume that senior managers will monitor their peers
despite the incentive to do otherwise, there is little evidence that their
efforts are effective: fraud is usually committed by people who control

131 See, e.g., Roberta Romano, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the Making of Quack
Corporate Governance, 114 YALE L.J. 1521, 1531-33, 1604-06 & tbl.4 (2005)
(collecting data from sixteen empirical studies on correlation between audit
committee independence and financial restatement, and reporting that eleven find no
such correlation); April Klein, Audit Committee, Board of Director Characteristics,&
Earnings Management (N.Y.U. Law & Econ. Research, Paper No. 06-42, 2006),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=246674 (finding no positive correlation between
majority independent audit committee and earnings manipulation).
132 Under investor and government pressure, some of the nation's largest banks
changed their clawback policies from 2008 to 2009. In its 2009 proxy statement,
Citigroup disclosed that it can recover any bonus or incentive compensation that is
based on earnings that are later "shown to be materially inaccurate," whether by
misconduct or mistake. CITIGROUP, INC., 2009 PROXY STATEMENT 39 (2009). A year
earlier, Citi disclosed that it could only recoup compensation if there was a
restatement and the "executive engaged in intentional misconduct that caused or
partially caused the need for the restatement." CITIGROUP, INC., 2008 PROxY STATEMENT
47 (2008).
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the relevant information and checking the accuracy of that
information is near to impossible."'
Empirical studies have undermined the assumption that internal
monitoring effectively deters accounting fraud. Professor Alexander
Dyck and his collaborators report that internal governance
mechanisms detect 34.3% of disclosed fraud, while external actors
detect nearly more than twice as often (65.7%).13 They do caution,
however, that it is empirically impossible to analyze whether internal
monitors catch accounting fraud early, without having to file a
restatement, because that information is not disclosed to the market.135
The available evidence does not support the conclusion that firms
are better able to monitor and control top management than external
enforcers. It does, however, suggest that the return on monitoring
costs will likely be small or negative in the case of accounting fraud. In
addition, while vicarious liability may induce firms to create better
monitoring mechanisms, it is difficult to disaggregate the effect of
liability from the regulatory mandate that firms put in place an
effective internal controls system and a fully independent audit
committee.
3.

Inferior Sanctioning

Vicarious corporate liability can provide superior deterrence if the
firm is better able to sanction dishonest employees than external
enforcers.' 3 6 If so, vicarious corporate liability is merely an indirect
way of sanctioning individual wrongdoers.13 ' The firm is better at
sanctioning if any of the following is true: (1) it is able to sanction
individual wrongdoers more accurately than external enforcers; (2) it
can impose a sanction on individuals more cheaply; or (3) it can
impose sanctions that are unavailable to external enforcers, provided
that those sanctions deter individuals more effectively (e.g., control
over wages and terms of employment, indemnification, or the
possibility of future advancement and compensation).
Arlen & Carney, supra note 5, at 716.
3' See Alexander Dyck, Adair Morse & Luigi Zingales, Who Blows the Whistle on
Corporate Fraud? 52 & tbl.2 (CRSP Working Paper No. 618, 2007), available at
http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/finance/paperswho%20blows%20the%20whistle.pdf.
133

u3

See id. at 10-11.

1
13

See Arlen, supra note 5, at 835.

Id.

See id.; Alan 0. Sykes, The Boundaries of Vicarious Liability: An Economic
Analysis of the Scope of Employment Rule and Related Legal Doctrines, 101 HARv. L. REV.
563, 570 (1988) [hereinafter Sykes, Boundariesof Vicarious Liability].
138

1308

University of California,Davis

[Vol. 44:1281

None of these three conditions is satisfied in accounting fraud.
Available evidence suggests that firms do not sanction managers more
accurately than external enforcers.13 1 If firms impose a sanction for
fraud at all, the sole sanction employed is termination.""' Although the
firm may have a right to be indemnified, it is usually inefficiently
costly for the firm to sue individual wrongdoers or pursue sanctions
beyond termination.14' Additional sanctions for individuals are,
therefore, rare and are virtually always imposed by the government
(i.e., the SEC or prosecutors), not the firm.' Finally, the firm's ability
to sanction top management is limited because the firm cannot control
the individual's post-termination employment, nor can it impose

nonmonetary sanctions.14 3
Professor Vikramaditya Khanna suggests that in situations involving
top management, such as accounting fraud, agency problems and
statutory limitations on indemnification are the cause of inferior
sanctioning by firms." Top management controls the appointment
and tenure of directors, which reduces directors' incentives to oversee
14
Furthermore, revealing fraud and
management and sanction them."
sanctioning dishonest employees requires "directors to take actions
that will decrease share price without offering any prospect of an
offsetting future increase in share price."146 As a result, directors may
be reluctant to act.

19 See Arlen, supra note 5, at 860 & n.79 (noting that firms' sanctioning tools are
limited to termination, while state's toolbox also includes future and nonmonetary
sanctions, among other sanctioning mechanisms); Karpoff et al., Consequences to
Managers, supra note 10, at 201 & tbl.3 (noting that more than 90% of employees
identified in securities fraud class actions are fired, but omitting any reference to
additional employer-imposed sanctions).
0 See Karpoff et al., Consequences to Managers, supra note 10, at 201 & tbl.3.
"I See Baer, Insuring CorporateCrime, supra note 40, at 1035.
142 See Karpoff et al., Consequences to Managers, supra note 10, at 210 & tbl.8, 212
& tbl.9 (reporting that fraud-committing managers are disbarred in about 30.0% of
cases, indicted in 27.5% of cases, imprisoned in 11.7% of cases, fined in less than half
of cases and when fined, median fine equaled a mere $100,000).
"
In addition, Sykes notes if the firm's only available device to maintain
employees' incentives is an indemnification action (and firing), then imposing liability
on the firm will not deter employee wrongdoing. See Sykes, Boundaries of Vicarious
Liability, supra note 138, at 570.
See generally Khanna, Behavior of Top Management, supra note 15, at 1254-55
4
(suggesting that inferiority of corporate sanctions may be due to agency costs and
statutory limitations).
"4 See Assaf Hamdani & Reinier Kraakman, Rewarding Outside Directors, 105
MICH. L. REV. 1677, 1685 (2007).
146 Id. at 1684.

2011] Leverage, Sanctions, and Deterrence of Accounting Fraud

1309

Recent reports suggest that boards may have become more willing to
investigate wrongdoing independently, but the mere fact of
investigation does not translate into sanctions."' The boards can fire
dishonest managers, but the firm may have to pay severance and
forego indemnification to avoid proving intentional wrongdoing in
court. A court battle would not only be costly for the firm, but may
expose board members themselves to the risk of liability (or perceived
risk thereof) and would likely harm the firm's reputation.
It is not surprising that firms rarely require dishonest managers to
Because top
indemnify the firm for fraud-related losses."
management controls the firm's actions and because external
sanctioning is uncertain and costly, management can ordinarily avoid
sanctions by settling the case on behalf of the firm early, before much
evidence of wrongdoing is discovered. Managers' indemnification
agreements (requiring the firm to indemnify agents for job-related
costs and liability)"' and D&O insurance put additional pressure on
firms to settle to avoid adjudication of dishonesty.o
Holding the firm, but not individual wrongdoers, liable is, thus,
likely to have little effect on preventing accounting fraud. Even if
managers are held liable along with the firm, many courts and the SEC
have held that it is against public policy for a co-defendant to seek
indemnification from another when both have been held liable.15 ' And
if the firm settles, which it nearly always does, dishonest managers
avoid sanctions altogether."' The only managers who contributed

See generally Marcel Kahan & Edward Rock, Embattled CEOs, 88 TEX. L. REV.
987, 1029-32 (2010) (reporting that boards have become more powerful vis-A-vis
CEO, and are more willing to monitor and replace CEO today than they were ten
years ago).
148 However, full liability shifting is often not necessary. Even modest proportional
liability imposed on culpable agents is likely to provide some deterrence. See Coffee,
Reforming Securities Class Action, supra note 5, at 1579-80. This is because it increases
the costs of securities fraud to the agents and reduces their moral hazard. In addition,
individuals are loss-averse, and losses loom larger than gains. See Daniel Kahneman &
Amos Tversky, Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA
263, 288 (1979).
'4
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 145(a) (2009); United States v. Stein, 435 F. Supp. 2d.
330, 339 n.25 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (citing defendant's employment agreement that
provided if he were named as defendant in any action based on his activities with firm,
firm would indemnify him, except as to "wilful or intentional unlawful acts").
15o Pritchard, Who Cares?, supra note 5, at 885-86.
'"'
Arlen & Carney, supra note 5, at 711.
152 Coffee, Reforming Securities Class Action, supra note 5, at 1566-70.
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personally to a settlement have done so as part of a plea agreement or
settlement with the SEC. 15
4.

Risk Shifting

Even if vicarious corporate liability does not deter employee
wrongdoing better than individual liability, commentators have argued
that the former is efficient because it shifts the risk of liability from
risk-averse managers to risk-neutral diversified shareholders, who can
bear liability more cheaply.' Relying on this logic, Professor Reinier
Kraakman argues that individual liability is only appropriate where
corporate liability is exhausted and where the gravity of the offense
warrants additional deterrence. 5
The firm can bear the risk of unintentional wrongs better, but is not
better positioned to bear risk for intentional wrongdoing of top
management.' 56 Risk-shifting creates moral hazard, like any form of
insurance. If managers can shift the risk of liability to someone else,
they are likely to commit more fraud.' Where the firm is unable to
monitor effectively its employees - like in accounting fraud where
managers control the information, and agency problems frequently
prevent the firm from sanctioning them - corporate liability
"generally reduces the level of precautionary behavior." 5 8
In addition, accounting fraud harms the firm and its shareholders,
rather than third parties, as is common for many other corporate
wrongs.' 59 Imposing liability for accounting fraud on the firms'
shareholders requires "the victims of the violation [to] pay an
153 See id. at 1551. In Cendant accounting fraud, the securities fraud class action
was settled in 2001 for $2.85 billion without any individual contribution. In re
Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 286, 288, 291 (3d Cir. 2001). Later, the company's
founders Kirk Shelton and Walter Forbes were indicted and convicted of securities
fraud and were required to pay back more than $3 billion that the fraud cost Cendant.
'5 Arlen & Carney, supra note 5, at 719. The same argument has been made in
support of the business judgment rule. If directors were held liable even for negligent
wrongs, they would exercise excessive caution and err on the side of doing less, which
would reduce the levels of efficient business risk-taking. Since the amount of potential
liability in the context of firms is huge, the business judgment rule is used to
counteract directors' risk aversion.
115
Kraakman, supra note 30, at 885.
15
Khanna, Behavior of Top Management, supra note 15, at 1254; see also Alan 0.
Sykes, An Efficiency Analysis of Vicarious Liability Under the Law of Agency, 91 YALE L.J.
168, 183-84 (1981) [hereinafter Sykes, Efficiency Analysis].
'5 See Khanna, Behavior of Top Management, supra note 15, at 1254-55 & n.173-75.
' Sykes, Efficiency Analysis, supra note 156, at 186-87.
'5 "Shareholders are victims, not beneficiaries, of their agents' misstatements
motivated by entrenchment." Pritchard, Markets as Monitors, supra note 5, at 932.
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additional penalty for their own victimization."'6 Furthermore, some
empirical evidence suggests that vicarious corporate liability for
accounting fraud spreads losses from a risk-neutral group of investors
to one that is more risk-averse.1 6' Securities fraud class actions require
shareholders who bought shares outside the class period to
compensate those who bought during the class period. Retail investors
are more likely to buy and hold their stock than to trade actively. As a
result, securities class actions "transfer wealth systematically" from
retail investors (who bought shares on average outside the class
period) to more sophisticated and more rapidly trading investors (who
are more likely to have bought shares within the class period) - like
hedge funds - and their lawyers.'
Finally, even if we assume that investors as a group are able to
diversify their portfolios to reduce their exposure to fraud, that
assumption is not true for each individual diversified investor, as
Professor Alicia Evans has demonstrated.' In fact, she observes that
"many investors, not just a few outliers" suffer net losses (and others
enjoy net gains).'"
5.

Cost Internalization

A final argument in favor of vicarious liability is that it induces firms
to internalize the cost of wrongdoing. If the firm is held liable, its
shareholders will have the incentive to elect a board of directors that is
more likely to select honest managers and implement optimal
precautions. Even where the firm's precautionary measures are not
effective, the shareholders should bear the cost of the firm's activity to
the extent that they benefit from it.
For example, firms ought to be vicariously liable for evading taxes.
If only individual wrongdoers were held liable, firms (and their
shareholders) would have an incentive to hire dishonest and
SEC v. Bank of America, 653 F. Supp. 2d 507, 508 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
See Coffee, Reforming Securities ClassAction, supranote 5, at 1559-61.
16' Arlen & Carney, supra note 5, at 719; Coffee, Reforming Securities Class Action,
supra note 5, at 1560.
16
See Alicia Davis Evans, Are Investors' Gains and Losses from Securities Fraud
Equal Over Time? Some Preliminary Evidence 31-32 (Univ. of Mich. L. Sch.,
Empirical Leg. Stud. Ctr., Working Paper No. 09-002, 2009), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1121198.
'n
See id.; see also Jason Zweig, The Intelligent Investor: More Stocks May Not Make
a Portfolio Safer, WALL ST. J., Nov. 26, 2009, at All (reporting that although on
average diversification reduces risk, "[tlhirteen percent of the time, a 20-stock
portfolio generated by computer will be riskier than a one-stock portfolio" while
human-selected portfolios are "even more fallible").
16

161
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judgment-proof managers, reaping the benefits of tax evasion but few
of the costs.
But the assumption that vicarious corporate liability is superior to
individual liability holds only to the extent that the firm benefits from
employees' wrongdoing. When the firm does not benefit from
wrongful activity, as in the case of insider trading and, usually,
accounting fraud, vicarious corporate liability will not deter
wrongdoing.165 It also "offends social norms, ... sense of fairness, to
punish the victim for conduct it did not cause."1 6 6 Consequently,
vicarious corporate liability for accounting fraud increases the cost of
investing and shrinks equity markets.
B.

Additional Problems with Vicarious CorporateLiability

In addition to overdeterrence, vicarious corporate liability also
provides firms perverse incentives. Arlen observed that vicarious
corporate liability can reduce the firm's incentives to implement an
effective system of internal controls designed to prevent and detect
employees' wrongdoing. 167 An effective mechanism will discover more
employee wrongdoing, which, under a vicarious corporate liability
regime, will increase the firm's expected liability." In response, Arlen
proposed negligence liability for firms and liability mitigation where
the firm has implemented an effective system of internal controls.169
Her proposal assumes that the firm is a better ex ante monitor than are
external monitors. If, however, the firm's ex ante monitoring efforts are
unlikely to be effective, her proposed solutions will not deter
wrongdoing any better.170
165 Sometimes, accounting fraud can benefit the shareholders in the short-term: the
firm might be able to borrow at lower cost. See, e.g., Baena v. KPMG, 453 F.3d 1, 7
(1st Cir. 2006) (stating that fraud, like price fixing, "profits the company in the first
instance"); Cenco v. Seidman & Seidman, 686 F.2d 449, 456 (7th Cir. 1982) ("the
stockholders of a corporation whose officers commit fraud for the benefit of the
corporation are beneficiaries of the fraud"); AIG v. Greenberg, 965 A.2d 763, 827
(Del. Ch. 2009) (citing cheap acquisitions, tax evasion, and higher stock price as
benefit). But over the long term, accounting fraud harms the shareholders as a class.
In a market of low information (including the stock market and accounting fraud),
investors will assume all firms are lemons, which depresses all stock prices.
166 Coffee, Reforming Securities ClassAction, supra note 5, at 1562.
167 Arlen, supra note 5, at 836.
1
Id.
16.
170

See id. at 862-66.

If the court determines that the firm was not a negligent monitor ex ante
because it could not do anything to prevent fraud, the individual will be held liable,
while the firm will not. In that case, the result is the same whether corporate liability
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In a subsequent article, Arlen and Kraakman extend Arlen's
observations to the credibility of the firm's enforcement efforts."'
Internal sanctioning is costly for firms.172 Unless the firm benefits from
imposing a sanction on wrongful employees, employees should
assume that the firm will not sanction them. Since vicarious corporate
liability is imposed regardless of the firm's "fault," employees will
perceive sanction risk as not credible and will not be deterred.7 3
C.

Problems with Individual Liability

High litigation and investigation costs, limited resources available to
investigate, litigate, and punish fraud, substantial agency costs as well
as statutory limitations on internal sanctioning, result in low rates of
personal liability and, therefore, low rates of individual deterrence
under vicarious corporate liability. For similar reasons, Arlen and
Carney conclude that vicarious corporate liability should not be
applied in fraud cases."' They argue in favor of individual civil and
criminal liability, positing that it will provide superior deterrence." 5
Coffee, too, has proposed eliminating corporate liability for securities
fraud to reduce the ability of insiders to "pass[] the costs of the
litigation onto the shareholders."' 76
However, there are several reasons to be skeptical. First, private
plaintiffs are significantly less likely to pursue actions against
individual agents whose limited wealth (and insurance coverage) will
yield a much smaller recovery."' Although managers are usually
named defendants in securities class actions, private plaintiffs rarely
insist that they contribute personally to the settlement because the
expected return on such insistence is negative. Moreover, D&O policy
limits are usually sufficiently high to cover a satisfactory settlement.7 8
or individual liability is used. if the court holds the firm liable for failing to prevent
fraud even where the firm could not have prevented it (i.e., the court makes an error),
the firm will be forced to bear the additional liability cost, while the individual might
escape liability entirely or bear less than the full cost of her wrongdoing. In that
scenario, corporate liability is inferior to individual liability.
17' Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 80, at 712.
171 Id. at 693.
173 Id. at 714.
'
See Arlen & Carney, supra note 5, at 720.
17
See id.
176 Coffee, Reforming SecuritiesClass Action, supra note 5, at 1584.
"7 Id. at 1564.
178 See Black, Cheffins & Klausner, supra note 36, at 1098-1102; Coffee, Reforming
Securities Class Action, supra note 5, at 1578 (reporting that highest D&O policy limit
in 2006 was $300 million).
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If plaintiffs pursued culpable managers, managers will litigate
aggressively, spending their D&O insurance coverage on legal fees and
leaving little to compensate the victims of fraud. Professors Bernard
Black, Brian Cheffins, and Michael Klausner report that individuals
have been required to contribute out-of-pocket only thirteen times
over the last twenty-five years."' In all but two of those cases,
individuals were required to contribute because the firm was insolvent
(and, therefore, unable to indemnify agents), and its D&O insurance
policy limit was too low or the policy itself was invalid.so
Second, accounting fraud is notoriously difficult to investigate.'"
The difficulty of investigation increases with the size and
sophistication of the firm.'
Although the SEC'
and federal
prosecutors 8 1 tend to target smaller firms, studies have found that
accounting fraud may actually be more common among large firms. 8 5
Analyzing all restatements filed between 1982 and 2005, Patricia
Dechow and her collaborators found that the largest 10.0% of firms by
market capitalization filed 14.7% of all restatements. 86 Although the
disparity could be due to the largest firms' greater visibility, it also
indicates that despite greater market scrutiny, large firms are not
immune to accounting fraud. Presumably, larger firms can hire the

1'

8

See Black, Cheffins, & Klausner, supranote 36, at 1056.
See id.

18' Buell, supra note 77, at 1625; Neal K. Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE LJ.
1307, 1326-27 (2003); see Darryl K. Brown, The Problematic and Faintly Promising
Dynamics of Corporate Crime Enforcement, 1 OHIo ST. J. CRIM. L. 521, 536 (2004)
(discussing difficulties of detecting fraud when actors are specialized).
1'
See Buell, supra note 77, at 1625.
18
Cox & Thomas, supra note 39, at 765 (reporting that average market
capitalization of firms targeted by SEC is nearly three times smaller than that of firms
named in securities class actions); see Stavros Gadinis, The SEC and the Financial
Industry: Evidence from Enforcement Against Broker-Dealers 34 (Harv. L. & Econ.
Discussion Paper No. 27, 2009), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1333717
(observing that SEC pursues smaller broker-dealer firms more frequently than large
firms and imposes more severe sanctions on smaller firms).
1
In 2008, only 13.7% of firms sentenced under the federal guidelines had 200 or
more employees. See U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, SOURCEBOOK OF FEDERAL SENTENCING
STATISTICS 2008, at tbl.54, available at http-//www.ussc.gov/Data-and_Statistics/Annual_
Reports-and_-Sourcebooks/2008/SBTOCO8.htm. The report does not disaggregate
statistics for fraud nor include deferred prosecution agreements with firms.
185 See, e.g., Cindy R. Alexander & Mark A. Cohen, New Evidence on the Origins of
Corporate Crime, 17 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 421, 432 (1996) (attributing
increased likelihood of fraud to weaker monitoring and control by shareholders and
greater opportunities to commit fraud).
'8
Dechow, Ge, Larson, and Sloan, supra note 38, at 18 tbl.2A.
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very best accountants, internally and externally, so fraud should be
less common, and not the reverse.
Top managers, particularly in larger firms, can reduce their
likelihood of capture by delegating overt acts of fraud to lower-level
employees." Securities class actions or SEC enforcement actions
against individuals cannot proceed without knowing their identity.
Limited resources and high procedural burdens further reduce the
ability of private plaintiffs and public investigators (e.g., the SEC) to
gather evidence against dishonest managers without the firm's
cooperation.1'" Fraud cases against firms can easily involve "hundreds
of witnesses, millions of documents, and years of investigation." 189
Firms, whose resources are (for all practical purposes) unlimited, can
stonewall investigations by making broad assertions of attorney-client
privilege and work-product doctrine and conceal the activities of their
managers." Their ability to deflect requests for information increases
with size.' Without the threat of corporate liability, relevant witness
and documentary evidence may be very difficult to obtain from the
firm. As a result, individual liability has a limited reach in deterring
accounting fraud.
D. Problems with Fault-BasedCorporateLiability
Characteristics of accounting fraud - complexity, involvement of top
management, and shareholders as victims of fraud - undermine the
effectiveness of both vicarious liability and individual liability alone.
In response, commentators have proposed fault-based corporate
liability. 92 Although fault-based liability reduces the overdeterrence
problem, it creates problems of its own. First, most fault-based
proposals have been made by criminal law scholars and propose a
single measure of corporate fault: whether the firm had in place an
187 See Kathleen F. Brickey, Enron's Legacy, 8 BUFF. CRIM. L. REv. 221, 266-70
(2004) (describing complex prosecution strategy used to convict elusive WorldCom
chief executive Bernie Ebbers, who was very fond of delegating dirty work to his
subordinates); Kraakman, supra note 30, at 860 ("[Tlop manager's most powerful
risk-shifting tool [is] delegating legally risky policies to subordinates.").
'8
See Brown, supra note 181, at 536-37. "The more sophisticated the fraud, the
more difficult it is to identify as fraud." Buell, supra note 77, at 1627.
189 Buell, supra note 77, at 1625.
190 Id.
'91

See Brown, supra note 181, at 528.

192See Moohr, Of Bad Apples and Bad Trees, supra note 69, at 1364; Podgor, supra
note 70, at 1543; Weissmann & Newman, supra note 70, at 449 (arguing that
government should have burden of proving that firm failed to adopt effective
procedures to prevent employee misconduct).
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effective mechanism of internal controls.'" As discussed above,
internal compliance is unlikely to catch accounting fraud, particularly
those instances where top management is involved. In addition, these
proposals are uniquely prone to hindsight bias - the fact that fraud
occurred will be used as evidence that internal compliance failed and
that the failure was avoidable. Anticipating hindsight bias, firms will
either overspend on compliance, or alternatively, implement
"cosmetic" (and cheap) compliance to give the appearance of
compliance, while accepting the risk of liability. 94
Second, even if the measures of the firm's "fault" are broadened to
include ex ante incentives provided to managers to avoid fraud, faultbased liability is unlikely to produce deterrence superior to vicarious
liability because incentive compensation is not effective at preventing
accounting fraud.19 Similarly, because firms cannot sanction
individuals for fraud at lower cost than the government or private
plaintiffs, fault-based liability that depends on ex post sanctioning will
be inefficient.
But, firms control access to relevant information or can obtain such
access at lower cost than external enforcers. Fault-based liability that
depends on ex post reporting of fraud and cooperation can lower
enforcement costs, increase the likelihood that dishonest individuals
will be sanctioned and, thereby, produce superior ex ante deterrence of
individual wrongdoing. In addition, firm action is more easily
observable after the fact than before, reducing the risk of over- and
underinvestment in cooperation. Finally, only firms where fraud
occurred are exposed to liability, vastly reducing the potential costs.
Because liability depends on the firm's conduct after fraud has
occurred, it is useful to distinguish it from liability that depends on
the firm's conduct before the fact also by using a different label. This
Article employs the term "leveraged sanctions."

19

See Pamela H. Bucy, CorporateCriminal Liability: When Does It Make Sense?, 46

AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1437, 1442 (2009); Podgor, supra note 70, at 1537-38; Andrew
Weissmann, New Approach to CorporateCriminal Liability, 44 AM. CluM. L. REV. 1319,

1335-36 (2007).
'" See Krawiec, supra note 128, at 487. Given the uproar that corporate
indictments create because of the collateral harm, it is unlikely that firms whose
compliance systems were judged ineffective would be indicted, even if effective
compliance were an affirmative defense. Instead, prosecutors would continue to rely
on DPAs and ex post cooperation to determine the firm's ultimate sanction.
'" See supra Part II.A.1.
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LEVERAGED SANCTIONS AND IMPROVED DETERRENCE OF
ACCOUNTING FRAUD

Vicarious corporate liability and individual liability provide limited

deterrence of accounting fraud. Even though ex ante incentives and
internal monitoring are unlikely to be effective, several other possible
ways to reduce the incidence of accounting fraud exist.
One way is secondary liability imposed on outsiders entrusted with
ex ante monitoring (often called "gatekeepers"): parties who are not
the primary actors or beneficiaries of the misconduct, but are in the
position to prevent it, that is, lawyers and accountants." ' I f
accountants or lawyers are liable for failing to prevent fraud, they will
have an incentive to monitor carefully. But, gatekeepers have failed to
prevent Enron and other accounting frauds.'
Yet, deterring accounting fraud cannot rest on improved external
monitoring and better ex ante regulation alone, because sophisticated
managers often produce few discoverable signs of wrongdoing,
particularly in the early stages of accounting fraud. Although it is
better to prevent harm than to sanction it ex post, improved ex post
reporting and sanctioning will prevent harm ex ante because managers
will remain honest if the risk of discovery and sanctioning is greater.
Changed perceptions about the likelihood of apprehension and
sanctioning affect behavior of potential wrongdoers ex ante and should
result in less accounting fraud."'
The perceived likelihood of sanctioning depends on two factors: (1)
how likely is it that fraud will be discovered, and (2) how likely is the
dishonest manager to be sanctioned. External audits of accounting
statements are required to increase the likelihood of discovery.
Whistleblowers are in some cases promised bounties if they report
fraud.' 99 Offers of bounties could be expanded to those who blow the
whistle for accounting fraud, including firms who self-report
accounting fraud, though the effectiveness of such rewards is difficult
to assess ex ante. It could be that only firms whose accounting
196 See Reinier H. Kraakman, Gatekeepers: The Anatomy of a Third-Party
Enforcement Strategy, 2 J. LAw. EcoN. & ORG. 53, 53 (1986).
9
See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, tit. 1-11, VIII, IX, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat.
745 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 11, 12, 15, 18, 28, 29, 49 U.S.C.).
196 See Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 80, at 693; Coffee, Reforming Securities Class
Action, supra note 5, at 1579 (suggesting that shifting some liability in securities fraud
class actions to individuals will likely improve deterrence of accounting fraud).
'9
The False Claims Act gives individuals who file a qui tam action on behalf of the
federal government against government contractors for fraud against the government a
right to a portion of any recovered damages. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (2006).
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practices have already raised red flags would report wrongdoing. In
that case, bounties may only marginally expedite discovery of fraud,
without increasing overall reporting rates. 00
Another way to increase the perceived likelihood of sanctioning is to
increase the odds that dishonest managers will be sanctioned. 0'" As
described above, asymmetric information among firms, private and
public enforcement agents, limited resources of private plaintiffs and
public enforcers, agency costs, and bargaining restrictions significantly
lower sanctioning rates for managers. This Part proposes leveraged
sanctions against firms or groups of insiders with access to relevant
information as a mechanism to overcome sanctioning impediments,
lower enforcement costs, and increase individual deterrence of
accounting fraud.
A. Collective and Leveraged Sanctions
Leveraged sanctions are a type of collective sanction. Collective
sanctions, unlike individual sanctions, are sanctions against a group
when an individual within the group commits a wrong.202 They
include, among other examples, vicarious liability and liability of
parents for wrongs their children commit. Professor Daryl Levinson
describes collective sanctions as "an indirect way of controlling
individual wrongdoers." 203 He argues that collective sanctions,
whether leveraged or not, provide superior deterrence where "[g] roup
members .. . are in an advantageous position to identify, monitor, and
200 Cf Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting
of Behavior, 102 J. POL. ECON. 583, 601-02 (1994) (arguing in favor of providing
rewards to criminals who self-report, but noting that rewards must be adjusted
accurately for likelihood of apprehension to provide optimal deterrence). Expedited
discovery may reduce the social cost of fraud marginally. Since most accounting
frauds are not discovered until they become too difficult to hide, few firms will report
fraud before very late. As explained above, internal monitoring systems will rarely
alert firms to accounting fraud early.
201 It is the perception of sanctioning that affects individual behavior. One way to
change perceptions is by increasing the actual rates of sanctioning; another is by
making sanctioning more visible. See Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard
Thaler, A BehavioralApproach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1538-39
(1998). However, given the current fascination with "perp walks" for executives
arrested for accounting fraud and the high level of journalistic interest in convictions
and long prison sentences for fraudulent managers, it is unlikely that visibility of
sanctioning could be increased appreciably. Actual sanctioning rates, on the other
hand, could be increased and reported as such to change individuals' perceptions of
the likelihood of sanctioning.
202 See Levinson, supra note 25, at 348.
203 Id. at 349.
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control responsible individuals, and can be motivated by the threat of
sanctions to do so," even where they do not benefit from the
wrongdoing.
Collective sanctions can be either unconditional or conditional.
Unconditional collective sanctions are imposed regardless of the
group's behavior, while conditional collective sanctions are threatened
against the group and used as leverage to increase the likelihood that
the condition will be satisfied. Unconditional collective sanctions will
likely be superior to individual sanctions when the group subject to
the sanction is better able to determine who is the culpable individual
within the group and can sanction her more effectively than can the
external enforcer. Collective sanctions merely give the group the
incentive to use its superior information for sanctioning purposes.
Vicarious corporate liability, for example, assumes that firms have
both better information and superior means to monitor and sanction
individuals.
Conditional collective sanctions, or leveraged sanctions, on the
other hand, are imposed only when the group fails to satisfy the
condition set by the sanction, for example, by exposing the wrongdoer
to external enforcers. Leveraged sanctions are more effective than
unconditional collective sanctions whenever the group has better
information than external enforcers about the identity of the culpable
individual, but external enforcers are better able to sanction that
individual. Three reasons are possible: because external sanctions are
cheaper, because they are more frequent, or because they are more
effective. If the group chooses to withhold information, the group is
sanctioned. If, however, the group discloses information, only the
individual is sanctioned, while the group escapes sanctioning.
Assuming that groups respond to incentives, a leveraged sanction
increases the probability that the culpable individual will be
sanctioned.
In particular, collective sanctions are effective when information
constraints would otherwise preclude sanctioning altogether or would
make sanctioning prohibitively costly.206 For example, in Ybarra v.
Spangard, a patient underwent an appendectomy and woke up with an
Id. at 348.
This is not to suggest that individuals are not jointly and severally liable with
firms for the wrongs they commit. But when a firm is vicariously liable for an
employee's tort or crime, plaintiffs rarely pursue the individual in addition to the firm.
See, e.g., Black, Cheffins & Klausner, supra note 36, at 1098-99 (explaining how
settlement dynamics in securities fraud class actions shift liability away from
individuals).
206 See Levinson, supra note 25, at 379.
204
205
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injured shoulder.2 0 7 No one on the surgery team would identify the
guilty party. Instead of dismissing his lawsuit, the California Supreme
Court allowed the patient to recover damages from the entire group

collectively. 208
The collective group-level sanction in Ybarra increased the cost of
noncooperation and, thus, the likelihood that in subsequent cases, the
group will either cooperate with external enforcers or demand that
culpable individuals within the group indemnify the innocent for their
share of the imposed sanction. Assuming no agency costs or
impediments to bargaining, wrongdoers will pay the same sanction in
an unconditional collective sanction regime, whether or not the group
cooperates with external enforcers, because group members will
demand to be indemnified or compensated. "
Imposing a collective sanction in cases of accounting fraud is more
complicated than in Ybarra. First, only conditional or leveraged
collective sanctions are likely to be effective.21 o Second, the identity of
group members with private information about accounting fraud is
difficult to ascertain ex ante. A leveraged sanction for accounting fraud
could be threatened against the board of directors or top managers.
Instead of trying to identify individuals with the best information,
which is by itself costly, the leveraged collective sanction could also be
imposed against the firm. Firms as collections of employees and agents
possess private information about accounting fraud. Hence, assuming
that firms can investigate at lower cost than external enforcers, the
costs of discovering information can be reduced by encouraging firms
to cooperate with external enforcers and divulge relevant
information.2 1' Although some firms will cooperate voluntarily, many
will not. Noncooperative firms can be persuaded to disclose
information if the legal regime rewards disclosure. A sanction imposed
Ybarra v. Spangard, 154 P.2d 687, 688 (Cal. 1944).
2
See Levinson, supra note 25, at 379. Although the sanction in Ybarra is
structured as unconditional, effectively it was a conditional collective sanction that
would not have been imposed if any member of the group cooperated with the
authorities.
209 This assumes no contractual (or other) restrictions that would limit the ability
to require indemnification. In addition, Levinson notes that "[albsent any group
solidarity, an individual group member will have little incentive to avoid sanctions
because she will enjoy all the benefits of misconduct while expecting to pay only a
fractional share of the cost of sanctions." Id. at 378.
207

210 See supra Part IL.A.3.
211 If firms were able to sanction effectively wrongful employees, the step requiring
disclosure of relevant information would not be necessary. Since firms' sanctioning is
severely impaired, we need to rely on external enforcement agents to sanction
individual wrongdoers. See also supra Part II.A.3.
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unless the firm fully cooperates in the investigation will reward
cooperation.m
Leveraged sanctions broaden the focus of the current debate from
sanction optimality to superior deterrence, when a theoretically
optimal liability regime is unworkable.2 3 In other words, leveraged
sanctions will result in more sanctioning for the same cost by enabling
external enforcers to "make an extra effort to subject culpable
individuals within the firm to liability."2 1 1
At first blush, leveraged sanctions appear similar to fault-based,
mixed and composite corporate liability that Professors Arlen and
Kraakman propose.m In both proposals, theirs and mine, a vicariously
liable firm or group can lower its expected liability by reporting fraud
and by cooperating with external enforcers. 16 Leveraged sanctions
differ from their proposal in several ways.
First, leveraged sanctions as proposed here expand the list of
possible targets of liability. While Arlen and Kraakman assume that
only the firm can be vicariously liable for fraud, this Article suggests
that leverage could also be used against knowledgeable insiders who
can discover the identity of the wrongdoers and the nature of
wrongdoing at lowest cost.
Second, Arlen and Kraakman develop a framework for corporate
liability for all types of intentional wrongdoing; this Article proposes
using leverage against the firm in cases of accounting fraud to reward
after-the-fact reporting and cooperation. Accounting fraud differs from
other types of intentional corporate wrongdoing in a number of ways.
Most importantly, top managers are involved much more often than in
other corporate crimes, rendering the firm's compliance efforts largely
ineffective."' Thus, sanctioning the firm for accounting fraud should
not depend on the firm's internal compliance, so long as the firm
212 Levinson calls this the "information-forcing feature" of collective sanctions.
Levinson, supra note 25, at 379.
1
Cf. Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution, supra note 31, at 881-82 (observing
that DOJ has "now firmly rejected an optimal deterrence approach to organizational
punishment"); Ilene H. Nagel & Winthrop M. Swenson, The Federal Sentencing
Guidelines for Corporations: Their Development, Theoretical Underpinnings, and Some
Thoughts About Their Future, 71 WASH. U. L.Q. 205, 217-22 (1993) (describing
Sentencing Commission's departure from optimal deterrence model because of its
inability to estimate probability of detection of particular crimes with any accuracy).
"' Hamdani & Klement, supra note 72, at 304.
215 See Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 80, at 687-88.
216 See id. at 693, 726-30 (describing two-tier composite liability, which combines
baseline vicarious corporate liability and large fault-based liability that can be avoided
if firm discharges its policing duties).
217 See supraPart II.A.2.
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complies with regulation regarding internal controls, as mandated by
the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and New York Stock Exchange ("NYSE")
rules.21 8 Determining the effectiveness of internal compliance
mechanisms after the fact is costly both for the firm and external
enforcers and is likely to produce hindsight errors. 9
Third, Arlen and Kraakman's proposal requires a careful selection of
the best liability regime, a precise calculation of the optimal sanction,
and assumes judicial involvement. They concede that liability regimes
they propose are difficult to administer 2 prone to error, 2 2' and
costly. 222 Leveraged sanctions, on the other hand, focus on the
relationship between the firm and external enforcers, and assume a
high likelihood of settlement with very limited judicial oversight, as is
the case for all but a handful of accounting fraud suits and
enforcement actions today.223
Finally, leveraged sanctions are primarily designed to increase
individual deterrence, and not as an optimal corporate liability regime,
which is difficult to do where most actions, public and private, settle.
In addition, the usual rationales for vicarious corporate liability internal monitoring, sanctioning, and providing employees with

218 For example, a majority independent board of directors, an independent audit
committee, regular external audits, and internal audits.
219 Meaning, the fact that fraud occurred proves, in hindsight, that internal
compliance mechanisms were not effective.
220 See Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 80, at 725, 730 (duty-based regime "would
impose a significant administrative burden on courts . .. composite liability always
forces a heavier informational burden on courts, and hence imposes larger
administrative costs"); see also Baer, Insuring CorporateCrime, supra note 40, at 1051
(concluding that Arlen and Kraakman's proposal is costly and difficult to administer,
because it assumes that court and enforcers' budgets can be increased, that courts and
enforcers can develop clear performance standards and apply them transparently, and
that courts can cheaply acquire accurate information about social costs of wrongdoing
and likelihood of apprehension in each case).
22 See Arlen & Kraakman, supra note 80, at 721 (conceding that strict liability
coupled with evidentiary privilege for firms that adequately police wrongdoing oversanctions those unlucky firms that get caught before they can come clean).
222 See id. at 723 (conceding that duty-based "regime does impose a higher
informational burden [than traditional strict liability]").
223 It is true that judges approve settlement proposals, but the court's review is
highly deferential. See, e.g., Hester Indus., Inc. v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 160 F.3d 911,
916 (2d Cir. 1998); SEC v. Worldcom, Inc., 273 F. Supp. 2d 431, 436 (S.D.N.Y.
2003). Judge Rakoffs recent refusal to approve the settlement between the SEC and
Bank of America and Merrill Lynch about pre-merger disclosure of bonuses to be paid
to Merrill Lynch employees is a rare exception. See SEC v. Bank of Am. & Merrill
Lynch, 653 F. Supp. 2d 507, 509 (S.D.N.Y. 2009).
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incentives to avoid fraud - are weak in accounting fraud.224
Rewarding firms for reporting wrongdoing after the fact and
cooperating, on the other hand, has the ability to increase significantly
deterrence of individual wrongdoing ex ante and produce efficiency
gains through lower enforcement and sanctioning costs. The
shareholders will bear ex post cooperation costs, but only if fraud has
been committed. So long as spending is efficient, 225 diversified
shareholders will directly benefit from the lower likelihood of
accounting fraud that increased individual deterrence will produce.
B.

Conditionsfor Superiority of Leveraged Sanctions

Leveraged sanctions should produce higher detection and
sanctioning rates of individual wrongdoing than direct sanctions
against individuals or firms in accounting fraud. Sanctions against
individuals alone are inefficient when, for example, sanctions are
imposed so infrequently that the aggregate sanction cannot reflect the
social costs of the harm multiplied by the likelihood of sanctioning.226
The death penalty or even life imprisonment for large scale accounting
fraud are not acceptable sanctions in modern American society.2 27
In accounting fraud, leveraged sanctions can reduce the barriers to
sanctioning. Although a leveraged sanction does not change the ability
of dishonest managers to influence the decision on whether or not the
firm will cooperate, it does change the cooperation calculus for the
group making the decision on whether to cooperate. Because firms can
See supra Part H.A.
Efficient spending in this context means spending in fraudulent firms divided
by all firms. Although spending in a particular case of fraud might appear inefficiently
high, it may be efficient across all firms because diversified shareholders benefit when
the incidence of fraud falls.
226 The social cost of accounting fraud is generally measured in the hundreds of
millions, but few defendants have the resources to reimburse the losses, let alone
multiply the losses by the likelihood of sanctioning. See generally Karpoff et al.,
Consequences to Managers, supra note 10, at 210 & tbl.8 (reporting average financial
penalties levied against individuals of $5.7 million); Karpoff et al., Costs to Firms,
supra note 11, at 593 & tbl.6 (reporting median losses in firms that experience fraud
of $380 million).
227 Arguably, the 150-year sentence levied against the 72-year-old Bernard Madoff
for defrauding investors in the largest Ponzi scheme to date is a life sentence. Some
have argued that sentences in excess of 20 years imposed on Jeffrey Skilling and
Bernie Ebbers amount to life imprisonment. See Moohr, Of Bad Apples and Bad Trees,
supra note 69, at 1345 & n.12. Although sentenced individuals would spend the rest
of their lives in prison, these sentences do not constitute life imprisonment per se.
Also, it is unclear what moral justification exists for reducing the sentences of older
offenders to avoid them dying behind bars.
224

225
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obtain relevant information more cheaply, leveraged sanctions lower
overall investigation costs. 2 8 Assuming at least some cooperation and
disclosure, leveraged sanctions will lower the costs of sanctioning
individuals.
The following sections describe in more detail the conditions under
which leveraged sanctions will deter accounting fraud better than
alternative regimes. They analyze the best target for leveraged
sanctions, the type and size of sanction imposed, what constitutes
cooperation, and the identity of the enforcer.
1.

Target of Leveraged Sanction

When the enforcers can choose between several possible targets of
leveraged sanctions, a number of considerations can affect the best choice
of the target of liability. They include: (1) who is the person or group
with the best information, and (2) what are the costs of threatening a
leveraged sanction against that person or group. The discussion below
will compare different potential targets for leveraged sanctions - the
audit committee, the board, top management, or the firm.
Ideally, a leveraged sanction should be threatened against the
individual or group that possesses private information about
wrongdoing. The cost of acquiring and disclosing information is the
lowest for the group that already possesses it. Alternately, a leveraged
sanction can be threatened against a group that is in the position to
obtain relevant information most cheaply.
One such group is the audit committee, which usually investigates
allegations of reported accounting fraud, and has the skill and the
ability to do so. Alternately, the entire board could be threatened with
a leveraged sanction. Such a sanction could put significant pressure on
individual committee or board members to investigate diligently, but
there are several reasons that make adoption of an audit-committee or
a board-level leveraged sanction less appropriate.
First, both groups will spend the firm's money, and not their own
resources, to conduct the internal investigation. If individual board
members are held liable for failure to cooperate, they have strong
incentives to spend as much of the firms' money as necessary to
remove the threat of their own liability, even when those expenses are
excessive.

228 In addition to lowering investigation costs, leveraged sanctions shift those costs
from external enforcers to firms. See infra Part IIl.C.3.b.
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Even if we normatively believe that all wrongdoers deserve to be
punished, it is usually inefficient to do so. 22 ' Although accounting
fraud is socially costly, the marginal cost of investigation and
enforcement expenses will eventually exceed the marginal benefit. At
that point, any additional expenses will not efficiently increase
deterrence levels. In addition, spending on internal investigation will
be shifted to the shareholders, who do not benefit when the level of
spending is inefficiently high. One caveat is in order. In the model that
this Article develops, the investigation does not take place until after
accounting fraud has been discovered and firms, thus, bear
investigation costs only if their managers committed fraud. For
diversified shareholders, the cost of an ex post internal investigation of
fraud will also be diversified. Spending significant amounts in
individual cases may not be socially wasteful because discovery and
reporting individual wrongdoing deters fraud elsewhere, and it
reduces moral hazard.
Second, leveraged sanctions, particularly criminal sanctions, against
board members conflict with normative notions that sanctions should
apply only to the morally blameworthy. While just desserts is less
important in civil liability, it nevertheless strikes many as wrong to
impose a sanction on an individual or a group that committed no
transgression. It would raise concerns that leveraged sanctions are
often imposed in error, on directors who are unable (instead of
unwilling) to cooperate as demanded by external enforcers.
Finally, from a practical point of view, leveraged sanctions against
the board or audit committee require legislative action and have a low
likelihood of being adopted. These sanctions conflict with state-level
indemnification and insurance provisions that compel firms to
indemnify directors for any damages except those arising from a
breach of good faith.230 In addition, since competent independent
directors or audit committee members are already in limited supply,
subjecting them to leveraged sanctions for accounting fraud would
further reduce their willingness to serve. Of course, firms could
compensate them for the additional risk of liability. 13 Compensation
demands by audit committee members could be useful since they
would signal to the market how likely audit committee members
2
See generally Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J.
POL. ECON. 169, 207-09 (1968) (developing law and economics model of criminal
sanctioning).
230 See 8 DEL. CODE ANN. § 145(a) (2009).
231 Note that the risk of liability is low. Targets of leveraged sanctions could avoid
liability by disclosing information.

1326

University of California,Davis

[Vol. 44:1281

believe the firm is to engage in accounting fraud. But, risk-averse
individuals will demand excessive payments.232 Furthermore,
increasing director compensation is politically problematic,
particularly when executive compensation is a major political issue.
Finally, although only a fraction of audit committees would be subject
to leveraged sanctions, compensation would likely increase in all
firms, not just in those that commit fraud, so the market signal of
compensation demands would be attenuated.3
Alternately, leveraged sanctions could be threatened against the top
management team. Managers are involved in the overwhelming
majority of cases of accounting fraud. 235 A leveraged sanction
threatened against the top management team will likely include some
individual wrongdoers and operate similarly as the Ybarra decision. If
the group chooses to cooperate, individual culpable managers will be
sanctioned. If, however, the group chooses not to cooperate, all top
managers would be sanctioned. Innocent managers who remain silent
would privately demand indemnification from those who were
involved in fraud, producing higher levels of individual deterrence for
accounting fraud. Agency problems and legal limits on bargaining that
impede internal sanctioning when firms are liable for their employees'
wrongdoing do not exist in private settlement negotiations among top
managers.
Although threatening sanctions against top management would
likely produce superior deterrence, they raise fairness concerns. To
have bite, a leveraged sanction should not be indemnifiable. In that
232 See Black, Cheffins & Klausner, supra note 36, at 1055-56 (observing
that
outside directors are very rarely held liable to shareholders and that they overstate
their exposure to liability).
233 The Dodd-Frank Act of 2010, for example, included a number of corporate
governance reforms aimed at curbing executive pay. See Jeremy L. Goldstein, Some
Dodd-Frank Executive Compensation Items, HARV. L. SCH. F. ON CORP. Gov. & FIN. REG.,
(Aug. 12, 2010, 9:12 AM), http://blogs.law.harvard.edulcorpgov/2010/08/12/somedodd-frank-executive-compensation-action-items/
(listing pay-related
reforms
directed at curbing executive pay, including say on pay, compensation consultant
independence, compensation committee member independence, pay disparity
disclosure, pay vs. performance, and clawbacks).
234 Cf. Kraakman, supra note 30, at 865 (theorizing that managers will "demand a
very large risk premium if they are simply paid outright for enduring even a small
probability of catastrophic personal liability").
231 See Prentice, supra note 49, at 782 & n.34. Karpoff and his collaborators report
that in 788 enforcement actions they analyzed, 515 chief executive officers were
involved, 723 of the top 3 executives, 1433 executives (including chief executives and
other top 3 executives), and 773 other employees. Their findings suggest that top
management is indeed virtually uniformly involved in accounting fraud. See Karpoff et
al., Consequences to Managers, supra note 10, at 210 & tbl.8.
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case, requiring innocent managers to pay a substantial sanction
because they cannot identify the wrongdoer (but the enforcer does not
find their inability to disclose to be credible) may strike many as
unfair. An additional concern is that the potential for threatened
sanctions in the future will undermine the group solidarity necessary
for effective management. 36 But group cohesion after members of the
group committed fraud is hardly worth protecting. Threatening a
leveraged sanction may produce superior ex ante monitoring among
group members, which is not an undesirable outcome, given the
limitations on internal monitoring.
Because top management is not a category with a set membership,
managers will try to re-characterize themselves as middle
management. Any such disputes are likely to increase the costs of
sanctioning without improving the outcome. But the most serious
disadvantage is that leveraged sanctions against management would
require legislative action, both to extend liability for fraud to innocent
managers and prevent indemnification or insurance from defeating
leveraged sanctions. If managers who refuse to cooperate could shift
liability to the firm (through indemnification) or their insurance
company, the sanction will not deter.
Finally, the firm could face leveraged sanctions. In all cases of
accounting fraud, someone at the firm will possess private information
about the wrongdoing.1 7 Threatening a sanction against the firm and
its shareholders can induce the firm to search for that person.
Leveraged sanctions against the firm will produce better results than
vicarious liability, although several concerns should be addressed.
During an investigation of accounting fraud, the board or the audit
committee will oversee the firm's response. They will hire outside
236 Levinson notes that leveraged sanctions can both undermine and solidify group
solidarity. Levinson, supra note 25, at 378. Either result may be undesirable in a group
of managers who must trust each other to work together effectively, but also question
each other's moves to prevent excessive risk-taking. In addition, enhanced group
solidarity will enhance the group's ability to pursue collective goods, not all of which
may be desirable. See id. at 388-91.
2.. Most criminal fraud trials relied on cooperating witnesses to prosecute highlevel managers. See generally Brickey, Enron's Legacy, supra note 187 (describing trial
techniques in Enron and WorldCom trials). Another recent example includes the
Lehman Brothers' use of Repo 105 transactions. The examiner's report tracks in
painful detail what information even high-level managers had when they entered into
fraudulent transactions. The report relied largely on cooperating witnesses and
internal documents, e-mails, etc., to piece together the picture of fraud. See Report of
Anton R. Valukas, Examiner, In re Lehman Brothers Holdings, Inc., et al., No. 0813555(JMP) (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2010), available at http:/Aehmanreport.jenner.com/
VOLUME%203.pdf.
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attorneys and accountants to investigate, who will rely on insiders for
information. To induce insider cooperation, outside investigators may
need the help of the regulator such as providing immunity to lowerlevel participants in the fraudulent scheme. In addition, the board's
incentives are not perfectly aligned with shareholders' interests. If a
leveraged sanction is threatened against the firm, the shareholders
benefit if the board cooperates, unless the cost of cooperation exceeds
the benefit. When top management is suspected of wrongdoing,
directors are faced with the choice of punishing their colleagues or
doing nothing. If the firm is liable no matter what directors do, they
have an incentive to do nothing. But if the firm can escape liability by
cooperating with the government, or if the firm's liability is reduced,
then the board has an incentive to cooperate. This incentive is limited to
the extent that directors' net private benefit from cooperation exceeds
the net private benefit of noncooperation. Cooperation may expose the
board or individual board members to liability, while noncooperation
does not when the sanction is threatened against the firm. If the board
believes that they are vulnerable, they will not cooperate unless the
alternative is worse. An example of "worse" is the "corporate death
penalty" that might follow a criminal conviction (or indictment). In that
case, if they cooperate, directors may be sued; if they refuse to
cooperate, they lose their jobs and may be indicted themselves.
The risk of liability is generally overstated, and rational directors
should understand that their personal risk of liability is very low,
unless they were personally involved in fraud."' Refusing to cooperate
may, in fact, expose directors to greater liability and will certainly
communicate a disturbing signal to external enforcers and the firm's
shareholders.
2.

Type and Size of Sanction

In a leveraged sanctioning regime, there will ordinarily be two
sanctions: one that is threatened against the firm and imposed if the
firm does not cooperate, and a significantly lower sanction that is
imposed if the firm does cooperate. This section argues that the
sanction that is threatened should be substantial to be credible. The
size of the sanction that is imposed if the firm does cooperate should
be substantially smaller, but the ultimate size would depend on both
the level and the cost of cooperation, and the benefit that the firm
received from fraud.

I Black, Klausner & Cheffins, supra note 36, at 1055-56.
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Sanctions, leveraged or not, generally can be grouped into several
categories: monetary and nonmonetary, civil and criminal, positive
sanctions (i.e., rewards) and negative sanctions (i.e., penalties).
Monetary sanctions are believed to be more efficient than
nonmonetary sanctions because they are more easily tailored to
optimal deterrence and do not require continued oversight for
compliance.239 Once the sanction is paid, enforcement ends, which is
not generally the case with nonmonetary sanctions.
Leveraged sanctions can be civil or criminal. The differences include
the attendant process, the frequency with which sanctions are
imposed, and the collateral consequences of the sanction." Criminal
sanctions usually result in longer-term costs than civil sanctions,
including imprisonment, disbarment, and the inability to conduct
audits of public companies.
Leveraged sanctions need not be punitive. Although sanctions
impose a cost on the wrongdoers or - in the case of leveraged
sanctions - on noncooperative groups, sanctions could also be
structured as rewards for those who cooperate.24 1 For a leveraged
sanction to be effective, the net benefit of cooperation must exceed the
net benefit of noncooperation. If the benefit for cooperation takes the
form of a reward (or bounty), the calculation of the net benefits to be
compared can be difficult since many of the inputs - benefit of
noncooperation, cost of cooperation - are not easily observable for
external enforcers (who determine the size of the reward). If the
reward is too small, it will fail to induce cooperation. If it is too large,
external enforcers will overpay for cooperation. Since the group that is
deciding whether to cooperate controls information about their private
costs and benefits, it will selectively disclose those costs to increase the
reward if the bounties are variable. But there is a more fundamental
problem with rewards: the source of funding.
Better if the benefit for cooperation takes the form of a cost avoided,
in other words, a leveraged penalty. 4 2 An excessively large leveraged
penalty will induce the same level of cooperation as one that is less
239

See Richard A. Posner, Optimal Sentences for White-Collar Criminals, 17 AM.

CRIM. L. REv. 409, 410 (1980) (arguing that sufficiently large fines deter as well as

imprisonment and are cheaper to administer).
21 See generally Fischel & Sykes, supra note 23, at 330-33 (describing why civil
entity sanctions are usually preferred to criminal entity sanctions).
21
See Hamdani & Kraakman, supra note 145, at 1678-80.
242 Although economists usually treat financial benefits equally with avoided costs,
individuals making the decision are loss averse and are subject to diminishing
marginal utility of money. See Kahneman & Tversky, supra note 148, at 288
(demonstrating that individuals are risk averse).
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In contrast to
severe (but still large enough to induce cooperation).
the oversize bounty, an overlarge penalty is not inefficient because the
firm will cooperate to avoid the penalty. A threatened leveraged
penalty that is too small, however, will fail. When threatened with a
sanction that is too small, the board of directors might
opportunistically accept the "settlement offer," but fail to investigate
fraud or shift the sanction to those responsible.2 "
The conclusion that an outsize leveraged penalty will produce the
same level of cooperation and deterrence as a closely fitted leveraged
penalty assumes that cooperation is binary, which may be unrealistic.
Some firms may prefer to cooperate as little as possible, choose a
scapegoat to blame, and reap the benefits of cooperation. 245 To some
extent, external enforcers are able to control strategic cooperation.
Enforcers are usually able to compare independently the quality of
cooperation by comparing information that is already available with
information provided by the firm. In addition, external enforcers can
find out whether the scapegoat feels himself to be wholly responsible.
Federal prosecutors, for example, have used immunity agreements and
proffers to build cases against higher-level employees involved in
fraud. 246 Finally, external enforcers can condition the sanction
avoidance on continued cooperation, or withhold their blessing until
later in the investigation. 4 1
243 Expected benefit from cooperation is reduced by the cost of cooperation,
i.e.,
conducting an internal investigation, reviewing internal accounting documents to
discover wrongdoers, interviewing employees. See discussion infra Part III.C.1.
. In that case, a leveraged sanction will merely replicate the problem with
vicarious corporate liability for accounting fraud. Cf. Hamdani & Klement, supra note
72, at 298 (arguing that lawmakers should limit entity-level penalties to "monetary
fines that would not trigger firms' demise"). Hamdani and Klement assume that the
firm will always be sanctioned when its employees commit crime on the job. The
assumption is unrealistic because federal prosecutors rarely impose firm-level
sanctions. More problematically, the assumption leads them to propose that
lawmakers limit the conditions under which firms could be held criminally liable. The
analysis in this Article suggests that firms should be subject to liability quite often: not
only for wrongdoing that they could prevent and sanction, but for wrongdoing that
they cannot prevent nor sanction, provided that they can obtain relevant information
more cheaply than can external enforcers. See id. at 298-99.
245 See Brown, supra note 181, at 534-36.
246 See, e.g., Brickey, Enron's Legacy, supra note 187, at 268-70 (describing how
federal prosecutors offered WorldCom's former chief financial officer Scott Sullivan
plea agreement in exchange for cooperation against WorldCom's chief executive
Bernie Ebbers).
24'
Deferred prosecution agreements often condition lowered or waived firm-level
sanctions on continued cooperation. See, e.g., Garrett, Structural Reform Prosecution,
supra note 31, at 881, 889-90, 899 (identifying Thompson Memorandum as example
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One concern with outsize leveraged penalties is that the external
enforcer can use them opportunistically and demand excessive
cooperation. In accounting fraud, the group paying for investigation,
the shareholders, is not the same group deciding whether to
If the external enforcer threatens the firm with
cooperate.
liquidation, the board of directors may decide to overspend on
cooperation, depending, of course, on the discount offered for
cooperation. The greater the discount and the lower the cost of
cooperating, the more valuable is the decision to cooperate. In a civil
regime with civil sanctions, the problem is smaller than in a criminal
regime, and there are fewer collateral consequences. In addition, since
a firm would spend on compliance only after fraud was discovered,
high spending in an individual investigation does not imply
overdeterrence for diversified shareholders. So long as the marginal
benefits of reduced accounting fraud across all firms exceed the
marginal cost of spending in firms that are victims of fraud, even very
high levels of spending on cooperation will be efficient.
Another concern is that if a board of directors perceives the
leveraged penalty as overly severe and if the sanction would produce
significant collateral consequences, a risk-preferring board of directors
might act strategically and call the perceived bluff. Then, the external
enforcer would have to choose whether to impose the threatened
sanction (which harms many innocent corporate stakeholders) or to
settle for a lesser sanction with fewer collateral consequences. But,
boards are unlikely to wager the firm's future. Boards will face intense
pressure from innocent managers and employees to fold.24 9 A board
that wagers the firm and loses will face lawsuits. A board willing to
risk the firm's continued existence must have a lot to hide, suggesting
that wrongdoing is pervasive. If the firm is rotten through and
through, then it should be liquidated.25 0
3.

Cooperation and Waiver

Cooperation will generally require disclosing private information
about accounting fraud. Information will include internal accounting
documents, memoranda, e-mails and other messages, and minutes of
of conditioning sanction avoidance on cooperation with investigators).
248 This is true whether sanctions are threatened against the board of directors, top
management, or the firm. See discussion supra Part III.B. 1.
249 This assumes that individuals know the extent of collateral consequences that
the sanction will cause. It is hard to imagine that external enforcers will allow this
ignorance to persist.
250 See discussion infra Part III.C.1.
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meetings. It will often also require the firm to identify individuals who
were involved.
Although candid cooperation will be cheaper than stonewalling and
obstruction, it is not costless. Therefore, a leveraged sanction regime
for accounting fraud will need to adjust for the increasing marginal
costs of cooperation and waive the sanction before those costs become
excessive. Waiving the sanction sufficiently early will produce other
desirable consequences. Because external enforcers have mechanisms
that lower individuals' cost of cooperation (i.e., immunity, pleas, and
settlements), they may be better able to induce cooperation by
individuals identified in the internal investigation than the firm. For
example, while the firm can persuade employees to cooperate with the
investigators by threatening job loss, external enforcers can offer
immunity, plea bargains and settlements, bounties, and so forth. As a
result, the optimal level of cooperation from the external enforcers'
perspective will not be unlimited cooperation, but rather cooperation
to the point where external enforcers can continue with the
investigation more cheaply than can the firm. Often, the level of
cooperation needed to start an investigation against individuals will be
relatively small.
4.

Identity of External Enforcer

The Article assumes that the external enforcer will pursue superior
deterrence of accounting fraud but not maximum recovery. Public
enforcers, not private plaintiffs, are best suited to be the external
enforcer, despite the risk of capture. Superior deterrence in accounting
fraud results from increased liability shifting to dishonest employees.
Private litigants pursue maximum recovery and as a result usually
settle with the firm alone as the deep pocket. If firms forced dishonest
managers to internalize the cost of their own wrongdoing, then private
litigation pursuing maximum recovery would also produce optimal
deterrence. But, as shown above, liability shifting to individual
fraudsters is a rare exception to the general practice of no individual
liability (beyond the sanction of termination).252

251 Effective stonewalling usually requires hiring clever and expensive legal
counsel.
252 See Karpoff et al., Consequences to Managers, supra note 10, at 209-10, 210 tbl.8
(showing that most fraudulent managers identified in SEC and DOJ enforcement
actions were fired, but small minority were criminally sanctioned or paid out-ofpocket fine).
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Private plaintiffs usually pursue the maximum damage award at the
lowest litigation cost.253 They are not concerned with deterrence and
enforcement policy.' 4 Under a vicarious liability regime for
accounting fraud, private plaintiffs and their lawyers have the financial
incentive to settle with the firm and have the firm (and its insurer)
pay. 5 Private plaintiffs are likely to recover more and to recover faster
if they settle the case with the firm alone, instead of insisting that
dishonest managers contribute to the settlement.2 56
Closer judicial scrutiny of settlement agreements (akin to scrutiny
of fraud settlements with the SEC) could improve the capacity of
securities litigation deter individuals, but may require legislative
reform to implement.
Alternately, Professor Amanda Rose has proposed an "oversight
approach" to securities litigation, that would allow the SEC to screen
which class actions should proceed and against whom. 5 ' This
approach could be used effectively with leveraged sanctions not only
to "mutlel the overdeterrence threat of private litigation,"258 but also
to increase deterrence of individual wrongdoing. Similar to allowing
firms to reduce their liability by identifying the wrongdoers, the SEC
screen would require legislative action.
Without legislation that would replace vicarious corporate liability in
securities fraud class actions with leveraged civil liability, leveraged
sanctions for accounting fraud require involvement of public enforcers.
Public enforcers are primarily interested in maximizing deterrence,
while recovery is less important. The SEC, for example, has recovered
billions of dollars in disgorgements and fines for securities violations,
yet none of the money has been added to its budget.2 5 9 Instead, it is
See Rose, supra note 7, at 1337-38.
See Richard A. Bierschbach & Alex Stein, Overenforcement, 93 GEO. L.J. 1743,
1777 (2005).
255 See Coffee, Reforming Securities Class Action, supra note 5, at 1550 (reporting
that secondary defendants, including individual wrongdoers, contribute only 0.4% of
securities fraud class action settlement amounts).
256 See Black, Cheffins & Klausner, supra note 36, at 1102-04; Coffee, Reforming
Securities Class Action, supra note 5, at 1549-50.
257 See Rose, supra note 7, at 1305-06.
253

254

258

Id.

See Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC and the Madoff Scandal: Three Narratives in
Search of a Story 14 (Georgetown Law Research Paper No. 1475433, 2009), available
at http://ssm.com/abstract=1475433 [hereinafter Langevoort, Three Narratives]. In
2008 alone, the SEC obtained orders against securities violators to disgorge $774
million and pay additional $256 million in fines. SEC, SELECT SEC AND MARKET DATA 2
(2009), available at http://sec.gov/about/secstats2008.pdf/. Although not all of the
disgorgement orders and fines were successfully collected (collection rates ranged
259
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paid to the Treasury and included in the general fund. As a result, the
SEC has no direct financial incentive to forego pursuing individuals to
increase the fine paid by the firm.260 Public enforcers also are better
able to adjust the leveraged sanction to fit the offense. The SEC can
engage in "discretionary nonenforcement" against those who commit
accounting violations in letter but not in spirit. 26 1
Although public enforcers are better able to deter, commentators
have identified several problems with public enforcement. Public
enforcers have limited budgets, and Congress (or state legislatures)
control those budgets. Langevoort observes that until after the
scandals in 2000-2002, the SEC had been underfunded for years.262
The underfunding was the product of "a government-wide, antiregulatory philosophy." 2 63 Furthermore, public enforcers are more
likely to be captured by the groups they regulate than dispersed
private enforcers. But Professor Matthew Stephenson argues that
concerns about capture have been overblown and that "public
interest" considerations play an important role in public agency
decision-making. 26 Finally, in order to appear tough on fraud, the
SEC has in the past focused on the company instead of the individuals.
"If you want to get the company to sign on the dotted line and show
how quickly you are moving, you go for the company," said Edward
Fleischman, a former SEC commissioner, adding that the SEC "will
get more pushback if [it] go[es] after the individual." 265
Despite the problems with public enforcement, employing leveraged
sanctions should produce better deterrence of individual wrongdoing.
from 40% in 2003, 82% and 86% in 2006 and 2004, to 96% in 2005). SEC, FY 2008
http://sec.gov/about/
available at
(2009),
157
BUDGET
PERFORMANCE
2008budgetperform.pdf. SEC's 2008 budget totaled $906 million while its 2009
budget was $913 million. SEC, IN BRIEF: FY 2009 CONGRESSIONAL JUSTIFICATION 2
(2008), available at http://sec.gov/about/secfy09congbudgjust.pdf.
2
The SEC could use large recoveries as a bargaining chip for a budget increase,
but there is no evidence to support this contention. SEC's limited enforcement
resources are usually cited as the reason why the agency so rarely investigates and
sanctions dishonest managers in large firms. See Langevoort, Three Narratives, supra
note 259, at 8-9.
261 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The PrivateEnforcement of Law, 4
J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 38 (1975).
262 Cf. Langevoort,
Three Narratives, supra note 259, at 14 (describing
underfunding of SEC as result of belief in self-correcting abilities of market).
263 Id.
See Matthew C. Stephenson, Public Regulation of Private Enforcement: The Case
2
for Expanding the Role of AdministrativeAgencies, 91 VA. L. REv. 93, 131 (2005).
26 Michael Corkery & Susanne Craig, Judge ForcesSEC to Defend Its Tougher Tack,
WALL ST.J., Aug. 7, 2009, at C3.
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Moreover, since leveraged sanctions reduce enforcement costs, and
then shift some of those costs to firms, public enforcers can pursue
significantly more wrongdoing without increased budgets.
C.

Rebuttable Limitations

Several objections are likely. Management shills aside, some might
argue that it is unjust and inefficient to allow the firm to avoid liability
by "ratting out" its employees after fraud has been discovered. Fraud
might be pervasive in the firm, so the firm should be sanctioned. In
addition, where fraud is not pervasive, it may appear unfair for some
individuals to be sanctioned but not the masterminds. Finally, some
may contend that leveraged sanctions are costly, produce errors, and
deter managers from pursuing desirable business activities to avoid the
risk of liability. The following sections elaborate on the objections and
reject them.
1. Pervasiveness of Wrongdoing
One common objection to reducing corporate liability is that
sometimes firms should be punished, and I agree.2 6 6
Hamdani and Klement argue, using the lens of game theory, that
imposing a severe penalty against the firm will improve deterrence
when wrongdoing is pervasive, but not otherwise (assuming that
shareholders cannot monitor individual employees). 67 If individual
employees are unable to monitor effectively each other to prevent
fraud, and if the penalty for fraud of one individual is firm dissolution,
then individual employees will have an incentive to commit fraud
themselves (to the extent that private benefits of fraud exceed costs).
So imposing firm dissolution on all firms (without excuse) will
increase the likelihood that any individual employee will commit
fraud. If, however, dissolution is limited to those cases of fraud where
fraud is pervasive, then the pervasive effect of the sanction is
eliminated. 26 Pervasive wrongdoing suggests that the firm completely
neglected its duty to monitor and police employees. In effect, the firm
266

See, e.g., Lawrence Friedman, In Defense of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23

HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 833 (2000) (arguing that retribution is important goal for

imposing criminal liability on corporations); William S. Laufer & Alan Strudler,
CorporateIntentionality, Desert, and Variants of Vicarious Liability, 37 AM. CRIM. L. REv.
1285 (2000) (arguing that moral blame should play role in deciding whether
corporations should be held criminally liable).
267 See Hamdani & Klement, supra note 72, at 293-94, 302.
268 The authors concede that "pervasiveness" may be difficult to define. Id. at 302-03.
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encouraged and rewarded their wrongdoing. 69 When wrongdoing is
pervasive, the firm -

as well as the culpable individuals -

should be

punished without the opportunity to eliminate liability for
cooperation, and leveraged sanctions should be employed with
caution (or not at all).
2.

Institutional Influence

Another argument against shifting the bulk of liability from the firm
to individual employees is that "[i]nstitutions influence people in
ways that sometimes make it rational to blame institutions for what
people do."2 70 Professor Lisa Griffin adds that "lilt is not clear ... that
the converse is true." 7 Division of labor within a firm diffuses
responsibility, so it would be unjust to hold "select midlevel
employees accountable for widespread practices within the
institution." 22 Griffin's concern about holding individual employees
liable for wrongdoing that involved others who will not be similarly
sanctioned is well taken. Ideally, all individuals involved would be
sanctioned with sanctions calculated relative to their level of
culpability and involvement in wrongdoing. But, superior deterrence
can also be achieved by singling out some individuals and punishing
them severely, deterring others from engaging in similar conduct.
Moreover, there is little evidence that DOJ and SEC target mid-level
employees while letting top managers escape without any sanction.273
The purpose of leveraged sanctions for accounting fraud is to
increase the likelihood that dishonest managers will be sanctioned.
For top management, the argument that institutional pressure caused
Id. at 302.
Samuel W. Buell, The Blaming Function of Entity Criminal Liability, 81 IND. L.J.
473, 491 (2006). William Laufer has written extensively about the moral culpability of
corporations and the ability of firms to have criminal intent. See, e.g., Laufer, supra
note 25, at 1351-52 (tracing historical progression of corporations as individuals with
moral culpability and ability for criminal intent); Laufer & Strudler, supra note 266, at
1287-88 (proposing for corporations "constructive standard of liability and
culpability" that captures moral fault of actor); see also Friedman, supra note 266, at
833 (noting that society thinks of corporations as real corporeal persons and, thus,
should be held to similar standards of action with imposition of criminal liability).
271 Griffin, supra note 31, at 332-33.
272 Id.
2" Professor Karpoff's research is useful: SEC and DOJ fraud enforcement actions
targeted 2,206 individuals. Of those, about one third occupied one of top three
positions within the firm (CEO, Chairman or President), and only about one third
were non-executive employees. Karpoff et al., Consequences to Managers, supra note
10, at 210 & tbl.8.
269
270
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them to misrepresent earnings is frivolous: they are the institution.
Incentive-based compensation may have increased the potential
benefit of fraud, but top management can always choose honesty.
Although managers devise the accounting fraud scheme, they
usually delegate at least some of the tasks. Their subordinates, who
complete those tasks, may not know that they are participating in
fraud because they believe the figures are accurate. On the other hand,
subordinates who are pressured into committing accounting fraud are
not innocent of fraud. Like the managers, they responded to
incentives, even if the reward was small. We may feel sympathy, but a
subordinate who commits fraud as a result of superior's pressure has
made an economic calculation of the costs and benefits of her actions
and decided that the perceived benefits exceed the perceived costs.
To reduce scapegoating of lower-level employees, the external
enforcers should try to distinguish misled mid-level employees from
those who chose to participate in the scheme, by closely questioning
those involved and comparing testimonies with other available
evidence. Even where the mid-level employee was involved, greater
authority should require greater punishment. In addition, the external
enforcers should stay focused on the most likely source of fraud:
managers, not mid-level employees. But, public enforcers look for the
kingpin, so this risk is small.
3.

Costs: Of Errors, of Overdeterrence, of Cooperation

a.

Errors

The most common critique against the use of leverage in criminal
law suggests that it produces errors.2 74 The firm may pursue individual
wrongdoers (over)zealously after fraud has been reported. In addition
to overspending on compliance, the firm's zealousness, reinforced by a
leveraged sanction, might also produce identification errors: the
hapless clerk who input cooked numbers can be reported to external
enforcers as a member of the scheme. Ordinarily, the individual could
exonerate herself by coming clean, but her access to relevant sources of
information and documents to support her statements may be limited.
In addition, when sanctioning of individuals identified as fraudsters
is severe, the accused individuals may be more willing to settle for a
lower sanction than risk a much higher sanction at trial.2 75
274 See Levinson, supra note 25, at 386-87.

Cf. Ronald F. Wright, Trial Distortion and the End of Innocence in Federal
CriminalJustice, 154 U. PA. L. REv. 79, 93-94 (2005) (observing that defendants plead
275
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Commentators have expressed concern about errors in accounting
fraud criminal trials.276 They claim that juries convict managers of
crimes carrying a punishment of decades in prison for presiding over
companies that went bust and not for having engaged in accounting
fraud. To avoid that fate, they claim, innocent individuals plead guilty
to accounting fraud to avoid a worse fate at trial. 7
There is only modest anecdotal data suggesting that many errors
occur.278 Individuals' perception of their own guilt or innocence affects
their willingness to accept a plea bargain. Innocent defendants tend to
reject plea offers that guilty defendants accept, and that "the concern
over the innocence problem may be exaggerated." 79 In accounting
fraud cases in particular, very few individuals will share the usual
characteristic that increases the pressure to accept a plea: a prior
criminal record."
In addition, this Article proposes leveraged sanctions as a superior
alternative to vicarious liability and not as an optimal sanctioning
regime. Vicarious corporate liability produces large errors, namely that
culpable agents avoid sanctioning. Under the existing regime, few
dishonest managers are sanctioned. A shift to a leveraged sanctions
regime would vastly reduce the number of false negatives (wrongdoers
who are not sanctioned) at the cost of perhaps some false positives
(innocent who are sanctioned).28 ' While the ratio is not clear ex ante,
guilty to avoid severe sentencing at trial even when evidence supporting plea is thin).
276 See, e.g., Sarah Ribstein, Note, A Question of Costs: Considering Pressure on
White-Collar Criminal Defendants, 58 DUKE L.J. 857, 858-59 (2009) (describing case of
Jamie Olis, executive of Dynegy, who, convinced he had done nothing wrong, refused
to plead guilty, but was found guilty at trial based on his boss's testimony and
sentenced to twenty-four years in prison). Olis successfully appealed his conviction,
and his sentence was reduced to six years on remand. See United States v. Olis, No.
H0321701, 2006 WL 2716048, at *13 (S.D. Tex. Sept. 22, 2006).
277 See Ribstein, Note, supra note 276, at 858-59.
271 See id. at 858. It is also possible that individuals only claim to be innocent, or
that they should have known that they were involved in accounting fraud, but turned
a blind eye or refused to learn that their actions constituted accounting fraud. As the
Latin saying goes, Ignorantia iuris nocet.
279 Avishalom Tor, Oren Gazal-Ayal & Stephen M. Garcia, Fairness and the
Willingness To Accept Plea Bargain Offers, 7 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 97, 113 (2010).
280 See Josh Bowers, Punishing the Innocent, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 1117, 1121 (2008)
(observing that "most innocent defendants are probably recidivists").
28 Although Karpoff and his collaborators conclude that guilty managers do not
walk free - the vast majority lose their jobs - their study does not suggest that
guilty managers do not, on net, benefit from accounting fraud. This is so because the
authors do not include benefits from accounting fraud in their model, only costs that
discovered guilty managers suffer. See Karpoff et al., Consequences to Managers, supra
note 10, at 213.
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experimenting with leveraged sanctions on a smaller scale may yield a
satisfactory answer. Finally, although normatively we might prefer
that no innocent individual will be sanctioned, in fact the legal system
allows for sanctioning errors. The burden of proof to prevail at trial
is not certainty, but beyond a reasonable doubt, clear and convincing
evidence, or preponderance of the evidence, depending on the nature
of the suit. The lesser burdens of proof are employed precisely because
of our shared belief that culpable or guilty individuals should be
sanctioned. The legal system is willing to risk some erroneous
sanctioning in order to reduce the number of culpable individuals who
avoid sanctioning.
Finally, the concern about sanctioning errors can undermine the
credibility of a sanctioning regime. If errors threaten to undermine the
sanctioning system's credibility, there are a number of ways to reduce
the likelihood and costs of errors. First, the scienter requirement for
finding of liability in court could be increased. If it is more difficult
for external enforcers to prevail at trial, they will be less likely to play
hardball at the settlement stage.284 Second, guilty pleas and settlements
with individuals could be subjected to more searching judicial review
when the product of a leveraged firm-level sanction. Third, employing
leveraged firm-level sanctions in a civil instead of a criminal regime
would likely reduce the sanctions on individuals (albeit coupled with
increased likelihood thereof). A public civil enforcer is more likely to
employ civil sanctions against identified individuals than is a federal
prosecutor, who operates with the criminal toolbox in mind. When
the stakes are lower, innocent individuals are also less likely to be
coerced into settling.

282 We even allow for error in death penalty cases. Although death-row inmates
have a right to virtually unlimited appeals of their case, our legal system sometimes
puts to death innocent individuals. The most recent alleged example is the case of
Cameron Todd Willingham, who was sentenced to death for arson. An independent
investigator tested trial evidence and concluded that the evidence was misrepresented,
finding it more indicative of arson than reasonably could be determined. See David
Grann, Trial by Fire: Did Texas Execute an Innocent Man?, NEw YORKER, Sept. 7, 2009.
283 The U.S. Supreme Court has defined scienter for the purposes of lOb-5 class
actions as "a mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud."
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 319 (2007); see Arlen &
Carney, supra note 5, at 705 & n.72.
I See Robert Cooter & Stephen Marks with Robert Mnookin, Bargaining in the
Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225, 246
(1982).
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Overdeterrence

Because leveraged sanctions increase individual sanctioning, riskaverse managers could shy away from not only fraud, but also
productive activities that might expose them to risk of liability.8 '
Particularly if the threatened sanction is imprisonment and loss of
livelihood, risk-aversion would affect managers' behavior. 8
Unlike overly optimistic statements about future performance of the
firm, earnings misstatement, the most common .type of accounting
fraud, involves making false statements about historical facts. It
requires that the defendants know the truth and misstate it.28 7 Because
firms already employ accountants, risk-averse managers can easily
confirm ex ante that their actions are lawful.
In addition, there is no social value in aggressive accounting.
Economic value comes from productive activity, while accounting
merely describes that activity. A fortiori, accounting fraud, such as
moving liabilities to off-balance-sheet entities, does not create real
economic value. It merely gives the appearance of financial health.
The appearance of financial health will attract capital, depriving
worthier projects of funding. if increased expected liability of
managers produces risk-averse accounting, this is not an undesirable
outcome.
If accounting is transparent to capital markets, then the style of
accounting, whether aggressive or meek, has no impact. A number of
empirical studies indicate that capital markets poorly interpret
2m Alberto Gonzales, the former Attorney General, stated in an address to general
counsel that "overreaching exercise of investigatory and prosecutorial powers - in
addition to being unjust - can create its own problems, through overdeterrence."
Alberto R. Gonzales, Attorney General, Prepared Remarks at the National Legal
available at
10,
2005),
(May
Conference
Counsel
Center General
http://www.justice.gov/archive/ag/speeches/2005/051005aggeneralcounsel.htm.
I See Hurt, supra note 73, at 369; Larry E. Ribstein, The Perils of Criminalizing
Agency Costs, 2 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 59, 61 (2007) ("Cautious managers will want to stay
very far away from conduct that has even the slightest chance of landing them in
jail."); Richard A. Epstein, The Deferred ProsecutionRacket, WALL ST. J., Nov. 28, 2006,
at A14 (arguing that deferred prosecution agreements often read like "confessions of a
Stalinist purge trial"). Brown observes that critics of the current criminal enforcement
regime likely "conflated potential criminal liability with actual practice." Brown, supra
note 181, at 525; see also Arlen & Carney, supra note 5, at 705-06, 705 n.72
("[Olverdeterrence is less of a concern in fraud cases (particularly where the firm is
concealing bad news) because the social value of the grey region separating the legal
from the illegal is dubious.").
287 See Arlen & Carney, supra note 5, at 705 & n.72.
' See id. at 705 ("Fraud on the Market produces substantial social costs and yields
no social benefit.").
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accounting. 2 Thus, aggressive firms will attract capital at the expense
of meek firms. Even if aggressive accounting does not indicate
recklessness more generally, this allocation of capital is inefficient.
Any reduction in aggressive accounting will produce more efficient
capital markets. Additionally, the extra cost of creating misleading
financial statements will be saved, increasing returns at firms that
would have used aggressive accounting. Hence, increasing the liability
for accounting fraud will reduce internal costs, investor research costs,
and produce more efficient capital markets.
c.

Cooperation

A final concern is that the regime would produce overspending on
cooperation. It would require firms, and indirectly their shareholders,
to spend resources after already having suffered losses from
accounting fraud. While the concern should not be dismissed lightly,
this Article argues that improved deterrence of fraud would lower the
overall costs of fraud and ultimately benefit diversified investors.
From a social point of view, leveraged sanctions reduce enforcement
costs in individual cases because firms can discover relevant
information about accounting fraud more cheaply than can external
enforcers. If the number of investigations increases, then the total
social cost of investigation will rise, but that cost will be offset by
lower social costs of fraud, produced by improved deterrence of
individuals.
Leveraged sanctions would redistribute some enforcement costs
from external enforcers to firms, thereby reducing those shareholders'
returns. However, so long as marginal benefits of reduced fraud
exceed the marginal costs of additional enforcement, individual
shareholders will benefit from leveraged sanctions. Because fraud is
very costly and because diversified shareholders will pay for
cooperation only when fraud has occurred (and not ex ante), overall
leveraged sanctions should increase return on capital by reducing the
incidence of fraud.290
Finally, the firm's cooperation is efficient only to the point where it
is cheaper than external investigation. Often, after obtaining initial
" See Dechow & Skinner, supra note 50, at 9-13 (including empirical studies cited
therein and demonstrating that investors respond irrationally to firms that miss
earnings targets).
210 Studies after Sarbanes-Oxley suggest that shareholders' returns improved after
regulation that, among other things, increased sanctions for accounting fraud. See,
e.g., Coates, supra note 26, at 92-93, 107-08 (including works cited therein and
explaining that costs are declining over time).
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information about the identity of wrongdoers and documentary
evidence about their involvement, external enforcers should be able to
take over and continue the investigation at lower cost than the firm.
This is so because external investigators usually have at their disposal
tools unavailable to firms, including the subpoena power.
IV.

IMPLICATIONS

Vicarious corporate liability, as employed by private plaintiffs and
the SEC, severely underdeters individual wrongdoing and increases
the pressure on federal prosecutors to pursue zealously individual
wrongdoers criminally.29 ' This Article proposes leveraged sanctions as
a means to improve civil liability, instead of continued reliance on
criminal enforcement, and suggests that the SEC should be the
primary agency to deploy leveraged sanctions. This Part proposes a
roadmap for implementing leveraged sanctions through the SEC.
Some aspects of leveraged sanctions would require legislative action,
such as threatening sanctions against the board of directors or
management, but modest yet effective reforms do not require a change
in the law.
The SEC rarely uses leverage, though there exist no legal
impediments."' Section 36 of the Securities Exchange Act allows the
SEC to "exempt any person ... from any provision or provisions of
this chapter or of any rule or regulation thereunder, to the extent that
such exemption is necessary or appropriate in the public interest, and
is consistent with the protection of investors." 93 The SEC already has
at its disposal a variety of monetary and nonmonetary sanctions to
threaten firms and has the authority to waive or reduce sanctions
against firms to secure their cooperation.
To test this regime, the SEC could employ leveraged sanctions
where it appears that the firm had proper monitoring and compliance
systems in place, yet accounting fraud nevertheless occurred. Careful
selection would shift the focus of the investigation from structural
reforms (the effectiveness of which is unclear) to cooperation.2 9 4
See Langevoort, The Impact on Director and Officer Behavior, supra note 38, at
29
90; see also Fischel & Sykes, supra note 23, at 321.
292 Cf. Coffee, Reforming Securities Class Action, supra note 5, at 1582-84
(discussing that SEC need not find firm liable under Rule 10b-5; it can use its
discretion to assign liability).
29 Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 36(a)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 78mm(a)(1) (2006).
294 Cf. Baer, Governing CorporateCompliance, supra note 123, at 949-50 (observing
that compliance efforts have not reduced incidence of fraud); Garrett, Structural
Reform Prosecution, supra note 31, at 860-61 (arguing that structural reform
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Where the conventional rationale for sanctioning the firm is absent
(i.e., failed monitoring), the SEC could threaten a significant leveraged
firm-level sanction, like a sizeable fine, deregistration, or a trading
suspension, unless the firm cooperates. While some firms will
cooperate without prodding, leverage will persuade additional firms to
cooperate. The SEC could then use the information obtained to
sanction the individuals.
A few words of caution. The public enforcer must understand the
underlying dynamics of a leveraged sanctioning regime. First, culpable
management will try to scapegoat lower-level individuals as the sole
wrongdoers. The investigator should take such claims with a grain of
salt. Second, the SEC should impose the threatened sanction if the
firm fails to cooperate. While a trading suspension, for example, is a
serious sanction, the collateral consequences of the sanction are likely
to be relatively minor, particularly compared to criminal sanctions,
and the shareholders rather than the employees will largely suffer
from such consequences. In addition, a trading suspension can be
lifted as soon as the firm remedies the problem. Third, some fraud will
require the involvement of criminal investigators and the SEC should
defer when appropriate. Fourth, achieving an effective level of
individual deterrence may require increasing the SEC's budget and
staffing levels. Currently, the SEC pursues only a small percentage of
accounting frauds. 95 This is not the product of capture or institutional
incompetence, but of the SEC's limited enforcement resources and
understaffing.2 9 6 The SEC's budget and staffing increases over the last
three decades have not kept pace with the increase in the number of
public companies the agency oversees, or the incidence of accounting
fraud. 97 Although leveraged firm-level sanctions will reduce
enforcement costs in individual cases, if the number of cases the SEC
investigates increases dramatically (and it should), then its
enforcement budget must likewise increase. Finally, leveraged
sanctions are most effective and less costly for those wrongs that do
not benefit the firm. Where the firm benefits from employee
wrongdoing or fails to implement effective compliance measures, the
sanction should be reduced, but not waived completely.

prosecutions are abusive).
m9See Cox & Thomas, supra note 39, at 763 (reporting that SEC pursued only 37
out of 248 of settled - not dismissed - securities fraud cases between 1990 and
2001).
296 See Langevoort, Three Narratives,supra note 259, at 14-16.
m See Karpoff et al., Costs to Firms, supra note 11, at 586 & tbl.1 (reporting that
number of restatements increased from 2 in 1978 to 246 in 2002).
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Critics will argue that unrestrained discretion by the SEC results in
overdeterrence and chills desirable business activities. But this Article
shows that overdeterrence in accounting fraud is largely illusory.
Increased likelihood of individual liability for accounting fraud will
also cause individuals and firms to engage in less aggressive
accounting, which is not per se an undesirable outcome.
Since corporate fraud is very costly with significant collateral
consequences, 291 criminal sanctions, including imprisonment, must be
available, in particular for the most serious frauds. Corporate fraud
offends deeply held moral beliefs of the community. It is an
intentional act or series of acts that usually lasts a long period of
time2 and has serious collateral consequences for the firm and often
the economy.2" It is committed by "talented, bright, highly educated,
successful people, who have 'made it', "31 motivated by greed,
opportunity, a sense of entitlement, and arrogance. 0 2 The victims'
expectation that fraudulent managers will be found guilty and
imprisoned is not irrational, as one commentator implied;303 rather, it
is consistent with the normative nature of law.
CONCLUSION

The empirical evidence of accounting fraud suggests that firms
overpay for liability and overspend on internal compliance
mechanisms that are generally ineffective at preventing fraud. On the
other hand, individuals who commit accounting fraud are rarely
sanctioned for their wrongdoing, which produces moral hazard and
individual underdeterrence.
Most proposals have focused on reducing the costs of fraud liability
to firms, but have neglected individual deterrence. Yet, accounting
fraud cannot be deterred effectively without liability shifting to
responsible individuals, usually the managers.
To sanction dishonest managers, private and public enforcers need
information about their identity, which may be prohibitively costly to
2" That is, fraud itself produces severe collateral consequences, not just
enforcement of fraud.
2 See Karpoff et al., Consequences to Managers, supra note 10, at 202 (reporting
average violation period of 27.4 months).
3
See Karpoff et al., Costs to Firms, supra note 11, at 581.
301 Pamela H. Bucy, Elizabeth P. Formby, Marc S. Raspanti & Kathryn E. Rooney,
Why Do They Do It?: The Motives, Mores, and Characterof White Collar Criminals, 82
ST.JOHN's L. REv. 401, 401 (2008).

Id. at 406-07.
11 See Ribstein, Perilsof Criminalizing Agency Costs, supra note 286, at 64.
302
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obtain without the cooperation of the firm. This Article proposes
using leverage against the firm or insiders who possess private
information about fraud to lower enforcement costs and increase the
probability that dishonest managers will be sanctioned. The Article
develops a model for leveraged sanctions to improve deterrence of
accounting fraud more broadly in regulatory actions and securities
litigation.
Improved deterrence is significant because it will reduce the
incidence of accounting fraud and produce more efficient capital
markets. The increased likelihood of individual sanctioning should
cause managers to avoid aggressive accounting practices and instead
pursue projects that create real economic value.

